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WAGING A WAR ON DRUGS:
ADMINISTERING A LETHAL DOSE TO KENDRA'S LAW
Jennifer Gutterman
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are sitting home watching television with your
family. You hear a knock at your door and think it is odd that
someone is knocking this late at night. You answer the door and it's
a police officer coming to take you to a psychiatric hospital. You
have not hurt anyone. Your family is safe and happy. The only
"crime" you committed was that you did not want to continue to live
with the side effects of Lithium and you chose to stop taking the
drug prescribed for your bi-polar disorder.
Does this sound incredulous? Hardly.'

People often fear what they do not understand, and for many
individuals, mental illness falls into this category.- This fear is
amplified by highly publicized incidents of violent acts committed by
people with mental illnesses.'
The New York legislature was
propelled into action recently when, on two separate occasions,
unmedicated mental patients violently assaulted innocent bystanders.!
On January 3, 1999, after terminating his medication, Andrew
Goldstein, a diagnosed schizophrenic,5 pushed thirty-two-year-old
1. Elaine Sutton Mbionwu, Involuntari' Outpatient Commitnent: If It Isn't
Voluntary... Maybe It Isn't Treatment, 4 Protection & Advocacy Systems News 1, 1
(Winter, 1999) <http://Nvwv.protectionandadvocacy.com/PANeCSWin99.htm>.
2 See American Psychiatric Association, Public Information: Violence and
Mental Illness (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http'/.www.psych.orglpsychihtdocstpublic-info!
violen-l.htm>. This fear is embellished by movies like "Psycho!" or "splashy news
accounts of serial killer trials where the word 'insane' . . . is heard often." Id.
3. See Lisa Anderson, Attacks Spur Call to Force Medications, Chi. Trib., June 1,
1999, at 1; Jack Guastaferro, Forced Treatment Doesn't Help People Battling Mental
Illness, Buffalo News, March 19, 1999, at 2B; Carolyn Thompson. Need Seen to Plug
Holes in Care of Mentally Ill, Associated Press Newsvires, Feb. 22, 1999, at 1.
4. See Anderson, supra note 3.
5. The term schizophrenia means "splitting of the mind," and involves an
"imbalance between emotional reactions and the thought content associated wvith the
emotions." Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No". A Histor' and Analysis of
the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 La. L. Rev. 2_83, 292 (1992).
Schizophrenia is a condition that splits apart the "normal integrated functioning of
intellect, emotion, and behavior." Barry Blackwell, Schizophrenia and Neuroleptic
Drugs: A Biopsychosocial Perspective, in Refusing Treatment in Mental Health
Institutions-Values in Conflict 4 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds.,
1982).
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Kendra Webdale to her death in front of a subway train.6 Three
months later, on April 28, a similar episode took place when thirtyseven-year-old Edgar Rivera was abruptly pushed in front of an
oncoming train by a schizophrenic assailant who had also terminated
his medication.' Though Mr. Rivera survived the event, his legs were
severed.' What could be more frightening than a precipitous,
unanticipated act of violence by a perfect stranger?
These cases roused concern for public safety9 and prompted the
New York legislature to facilitate the outpatient commitment of the
mentally ill.'"
Outpatient commitment involves court-ordered
involuntary treatment for mentally ill individuals in community
settings, rather than in conventional inpatient hospitals." In response
to the public outcry over these incidents, on August 9, 1999, New
York passed "Kendra's Law,"' 2 which permits state courts to order
"assisted outpatient treatment"' 3 for patients deemed mentally ill.
Before outpatient laws were established, persons suffering from
mental illnesses could be involuntarily hospitalized as inpatients only
after a court determined that they were a danger to themselves or
others. 4
Those individuals who were ineligible for inpatient
6. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Hospitals Face Lawsuit by Kin of Victim in Subway
Push, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1999, at B1 (describing the incident and developments in
New York's outpatient commitment law in response to Kendra Webdale's tragic
death); see also supra note 3 (listing articles that describe the horrific death of Kendra
Webdale). In March, 2000, Andrew Goldstein was found guilty of second-degree
murder for killing Kendra Webdale and was sentenced to 25-years-to-life in state
prison. See Guilty-and Insane, N.Y. Daily News, March 24, 2000, at 54; Pushing the
Insane into Jail, N.Y. Post, March 24, 2000, at 28. The jury refused to accept an
insanity plea for the schizophrenic assailant. See id.
7. See Nina Bernstein, FrighteningEcho in Tales of Two in Subway Attacks, N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1999, at Al.
8. See id.
9. Although these "headline grabbing" incidents were committed by mentally ill
individuals, such random acts of violence do not occur very often. Only about "4% of
all violence is committed by mentally ill people, and much of it is against family
members." Julie Marquis & Dan Morain, The Broken Contract Rights of Mentally Ill
Pitted Against Public, Patient Safety Debate, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1999, at Al.
Furthermore, research has shown no direct correlation between violence and mental
disorder. See APA, supra note 2.
10. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
11. These programs seek to "coordinate care and provide as many services as
possible in the consumer's own environment." Jeffrey Draine, Conceptualizing
Services Research on Outpatient Commitment, 24 J. of Behav. Health Services & Res.
306, 306 (1997).
12. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60 (McKinney 1999); infra Part I.B. (describing
outpatient commitment laws, with a concentration on Kendra's Law).
13. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(a)(1). Assisted outpatient treatment" in New
York is a form of coercive, involuntary commitment whereby mentally ill individuals
are ordered to comply with psychiatric and medical treatment in outpatient settings.
See Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry ("GAP"), Forced Into Treatment: The
Role of Coercion in Clinical Practice 65 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes & Susan Sachs, Man Shot by Police Told Hospital
Staff of Violent Impulses, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1999, at Al (referring to commitment
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commitment were left without any form of treatment or care.
Kendra's Law, a newly amended version of Mental Hygiene Law §
9.61,15 makes it easier to compel non-dangerous mental patients into
involuntary treatment on an outpatient basis."b Depending on the
needs of a particular patient, outpatient commitment may include
many different categories of services, such as case management,
mandatory medication, therapy, counseling, and/or supervision within
community settings rather than in an institution. 7
Although
outpatient commitment laws are of recent vintage, they are emerging
as a significant force in the mental health arena. Since Kendra's Law
was enacted,
only nine states lack some form of involuntary outpatient
18
treatment.
This Note argues against the implementation of Kendra's Law
because it infringes on the constitutional rights of the mentally ill and
fails to address their mental health needs. Undeniably, the bill was
enacted to provide the mentally ill with access to a variety of services
and to eliminate the legal and clinical barriers to timely treatment. 9
The freedom to refuse unwanted treatment, however, is a
fundamental right rooted in the constitutional protections of liberty,
expression, and the right to privacy.'
The murky standards of
Kendra's Law allow psychiatrists and judges to curtail basic freedoms

procedures in New York prior to Kendra's Law). Today, in order for an inpatient to
be civilly committed in New York, an application for admission must be executed by a
roommate, relative, director, or officer, and must be accompanied by certificates of
two examining physicians maintaining that the patient is mentally ill and in need of
immediate inpatient treatment to prevent a dangerous situation. See N.Y. Mental
Hyg. Law § 9.27 (McKinney 1994). If an individual can live safely outside an
institution, and is not dangerous to herself or others, due process will not tolerate her
involuntary inpatient commitment irrespective of whether treatment may be
beneficial. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); In re Harry M., 468
N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-64 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1983). Moreover, the danger that a
mentally ill individual poses to herself or others must be a "substantial threat to [her]
physical well-being to justify [inpatient] commitment." In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d
at 364.
15. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.61 (detailing New York's involuntary
outpatient commitment law before the enactment of Kendra's Law).
16. See Guastaferro, supra note 3 (describing the facets of Kendra's Law and
involuntary outpatient commitment in general).
17. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(a)(1) (McKinney 1999).
18. See E. Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Kendra's Law-The Culmination
of a 10-Year Battle For Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New York, Catalyst:
Treatment Advocacy Center, Nov/Dec. 1999, at 2; Health Policy Tracking Service,
Fact Sheet: Outpatient Civil Commitnnent (July, 14, 1999) <http'J/www.ncsl.orgl
programs/healthlhpts/commit.htm>.
19. See Guastaferro, supra note 3 ("What makes a difference is the scope,
flexibility, responsiveness and coordination of community-based psychiatric treatment
and rehabilitation services.").
20. See infra Part II.A. (focusing on significant Supreme Court and lower court
decisions recognizing an individual's constitutional right to refuse psychotropic
medication).
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based on subjective impressions and biases."' Furthermore, as critics
of outpatient laws have demonstrated, coercive treatment does not
work.22 Patient rights groups insist that outpatient commitment is
merely a "knee-jerk reaction"' that fails to resolve larger societal
problems, including a shortage of community services, crisis
prevention, and treatment facilities.24
Part I of this Note explores the history of involuntary civil
commitment of the mentally ill. This part also discusses the
development of outpatient laws in general, with a concentration on
the enactment of Kendra's Law in New York. Part II examines
pertinent Supreme Court and lower court decisions addressing an
individual's constitutional right to refuse involuntary medication. It
then scrutinizes New York courts' stance on the issue of forcible
medication. Finally, this part discusses the right of the state to
authorize involuntary medication in two situations: (1) as a result of
an "emergency" and (2) after an individual is deemed "incompetent."
Part III analyzes the arguments both in favor of and against Kendra's
Law. This part then demonstrates that Kendra's Law impermissibly
infringes on an individual's right to liberty, privacy, and freedom from
bodily harm. The Note concludes that the most appropriate way to
treat individuals before they become severely mentally ill is through
an array of voluntary services, rather than coercive therapies.
I.

THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS

This part discusses the history and background of civil commitment
and the treatment of mentally ill individuals, examining how the
advent of antipsychotic medication led to the deinstitutionalization
movement and the emergence of outpatient commitment laws. This
part also scrutinizes the features of outpatient treatment, focusing on
New York's outpatient commitment statute, Kendra's Law.

21. See infra Part III.C. (discussing the ambiguities of Kendra's Law).
22. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment 33337 (1997) [hereinafter Winick, Mental Health Treatment]. Professor Winick states
that: "the potential for successful treatment in many contexts would appear to
increase when individuals choose treatment voluntarily rather than through
coercion.... Indeed, such coercion may backfire, producing a negative 'psychological
reactance' that sets up oppositional behavior leading to failure." Id. at 337.
23. Anderson, supra note 3. Coercive treatment is not effective, whether it is
imposed on inpatients or outpatients. For example, "[r]esearch shows that those
subjected to forced treatment are at increased risk of drug dependence, disabling side
effects of medication and ...[i]t can result in damage to self-esteem and motivation
for recovery." Edward S. Kramer, Don't Force Patients into Mental Health Programs,
Hartford Courant, Sept. 25, 1999, at A14.
24. See, e.g., Guastaferro, supra note 3 ("The primary barrier to community-based
mental-health care has always been inadequate funding.").
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A. History of Treatnentfor the Mentally III

Laws relating to the mentally ill in America have been in existence
since colonial times.' Initially, states failed to distinguish between
mental patients and simple criminals and provided both groups with
the same institutional treatment. 6 The protocol of this era was "a one
size fits all solution... [to] put 'em all in an institution."2'7 For more
than two centuries, the fundamental objective of the government was
to expel the mentally ill from society, rather than undertake their
rehabilitation and release them into communities.' During the midnineteenth century, however, as prisons became overcrowded and
increasingly jeopardous, reformers crusaded for superior civil
commitment laws and the "asylum movement" 29 originated.

In the early stages of the movement, the process of committing
patients to an insane asylum was extremely informal and was
consummated by any number of persons simply applying for
admission."

In fact, "friends or relatives ... would apply to the

superintendent for admission without legal procedures or the direct
involvement of judicial officials."'" Moreover, psychiatrists in these
insane asylums possessed virtually unencumbered discretion
concerning the treatment of mental patients. "2 In the name of science,
they administered radical and often misguided treatments, including
lobotomies, sterilization, clitoridectomies, and psychotherapies."
Before the advent of psychotropic medication,' the focus of
25. See Edward B. Beis, Mental Health and the Law 3 (1984); Barbara A. Weiner
& Robert M. Wettstein, Legal Issues in Mental Health Care 41 (1993).
26. See Robert D. Miller, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the
Post-Reform Era 5 (1987).
27. Clarke Thomas, Mental Illness Treatment: Striking a Balance--ls the 'Least
Restrictive Environment' the Best for tile Patient and the Rest of Us?, Pittsburgh PostGazette, Oct. 20, 1999, at A31.
28. See Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 42.
29. Miller, supra note 26, at 5. Reformers such as Dorothea Dix and Mrs. E.P.W.
Packard revolutionized the care of the mentally ill during the nineteenth century. See
id. They "not only shifted the burden of caring for the mentally disabled from the
family to the state but also changed the community's attitude, to expand their concern
from one of self-protection from the mentally ill, to concern for the disabled members
of the community." Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 42.
30. See Miller, supra note 26, at 5.
31. Id. During this time, there were few procedural protections against wrongful
commitments. See id.
32 See Bruce J.Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current
State of the Law and Beyond, in The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication 7
(David Rapoport & John Parry eds., 1986).
33. See Marquis & Morain, supra note 9.
34. The term "psychotropic medication" or "antipsychotic medication" refers to
drugs such as Thorazine and Lithium, which are used to treat numerous psychotic
illnesses, especially schizophrenia. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note
22, at 61-68; see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,293 n.1 (1982) (describing classes of
antipsychotic medication and their side effects); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342,
1359-60 (D. Mass. 1979), affid in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980)
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institutionalization was on confinement rather than treatment.-5
Patients afflicted with illnesses, such as schizophrenia or related
psychoses,3 6 required long-term hospitalization in facilities that
primarily rendered custodial care.37 After antipsychotic medications
were introduced in the 1950s, the treatment of mental patients
underwent a great transformation. With the growing availability of
effective medication, reformers and advocates concerned with
patients' civil rights began working for the deinstitutionalization of
hospitalized patients. 39 The availability of psychotropic medication
led to a massive depopulation of the mental hospital system. 40 Today,
medication 4constitutes a fundamental component of treatment for the
mentally ill. '

Medication fostered the deinstitutionalization movement because it
was able to control the more deviant symptoms of psychotic illnesses,
abating
the
need
for
long-term
hospitalization.42
Deinstitutionalization is the public policy initiative underscoring
short-term and community-based treatment.43 Its premise is based on
the notion that once effective treatment is readily available in
communities, there will no longer be a need for involuntary
commitment.' The foremost objective of deinstitutionalization is to
(same).
35. See Miller, supra note 26, at 101.
36. Other types of psychotic illnesses include manic-depressive illness, psychotic
depressive reaction, paranoia, neuroses, obsessive-compulsive disorders, and
psychosis. See Beis, supra note 25, at 363-64.
37. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 68. Before the advent
of antipsychotic medication, psychotic patients were often delusional, violent, and
extremely withdrawn, and had poor prognoses for returning to society. See id.
38. See id. at 68. Widespread use of these drugs has been cited as the major
reason for the dramatic decrease of the population of mental hospitals. See id. at 69.
39. See Miller, supra note 26, at 209; Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra
note 22, at 9-11. Professor Winick states:
Rather than a long-term custodial facility, the hospital has become
essentially a short-term medical facility designed to deal with patients in
crisis, to diagnose and stabilize them on a course of medication to be
continued after discharge, and then to discharge them into the community
where their continued medical and social needs would be met in communitybased facilities.
Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 68.
40. See Miller, supra note 26, at 209.
41. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 69.
42. See Bruce A. Arrigo, The Contours of Psychiatric Justice: A Postmodern
Critique of Mental Illness, Criminal Insanity, and the Law 80 (1996). Drugs such as
Thorazine and Lithium relieve psychotic symptoms, including hallucinations,
delusions, paranoia, and withdrawal, which eventually leads to the decrease of violent
or destructive outbursts. See id.
43. See Miller, supra note 26, at 116-17.
44. See id. at 233. In addition, "[legislators were attracted to the movement by
the prospect of saving money by closing hospitals and providing less expensive
treatment in the community." Id. at 209. By releasing the mentally ill from hospitals,

"[t]he patients, and the money, could all be diverted to community mental health
centers." Id. at 233.
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identify patients who can be treated in less formal settings and release
them from psychiatric hospitals into a network of community care 5
The "least restrictive alternative"46 doctrine quickly became one of
the "chief slogans" of the deinstitutionalization movement. 7

This

doctrine provides an analytical guideline in ascertaining whether the
government has prudently selected the appropriate means to
accomplish a legitimate end. The monumental decision of Shelton v.
Tucker 9 first articulated this principle when it proposed:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
50
purpose.

Since the late 1960s, courts have applied the least restrictive
alternative principle to civil commitment cases."' In the mental health
arena, this doctrine is activated by courts deciding where a patient
should receive treatment and what form of medical treatment is least
intrusive. 2 Because state hospitals are deemed to be "antiquated,
overcrowded, and underfunded,"53 courts frequently order the
mentally ill to participate in alternative treatment regimens.' These
types of alternatives
include outpatient programs and community
55
support services
Outpatient commitment is a legal scheme that employs court orders
45. See A New Look at Treating the Mentally Ill, Buffalo News, Nov. 16, 1999, at
B2.

46. The "least restrictive environment" or "least restrictive alternative" doctrine

requires the government to pursue its ends by means narrowly tailored so as not to
unnecessarily encroach on important competing interests, such as the constitutional
rights to liberty and privacy. See Beis, supra note 25, at 193 (citation omitted).
47. Miller, supra note 26, at 116.
48. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 355; Douglas S. Stransky, Comment, Civil
Commitment and the Right to Refise Treatment. Resolving Disputes front a Due
Process Perspective, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 413, 437 (1996). The Supreme Court has
invoked this doctrine in a number of contexts where government action has
unnecessarily restricted individual liberties, such as the right to association, privacy,
and freedom from bodily restraint. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580
(1975) (bodily restraint); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (privacy);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960) (association).
49. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
50. Id. at 488.
51. See Beis, supra note 25, at 195. The first case in the mental health arena to
apply this doctrine was Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc). In
this civil commitment case, Chief Judge Bazelon held that the government has an
affirmative duty to explore all treatment options so that "[dleprivations of liberty ...
[do] not go beyond what is necessary for [the patient's] protection." Id. at 660.
52- See Beis, supra note 25, at 193.
53. Miller, supra note 26, at 233.
54. See id. at 209-10.
55. See id at 233; Beis, supra note 25, at 193.
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and other means5 6 to involuntarily compel mentally ill individuals to
participate in community treatment. 7 The tenets underlying this form
of treatment are that patients are better served in community
facilities, and states can reduce the ponderous costs of long-term care
by discharging patients from hospitals.58 Outpatient commitment
strives to provide patients with a copious array of community
treatment programs, including therapy and/or medication, thereby
reducing the likelihood of mental deterioration and preventing a
relapse that may later require hospitalization. 9
Forty-one states currently have outpatient commitment statutes.0
However, the classes of people affected by these laws, the conditions
under which they are treated, and the consequences for not adhering
to mandatory treatment vary from state to state.61 In some states,
outpatient care is utilized as an alternative to inpatient hospitalization,
and is designed for severely mentally ill patients who pose an
immediate danger to society.6' In contrast, other states use outpatient
commitment to treat individuals who are not presently dangerous and
do not meet the criteria for inpatient care. 63 New York's outpatient
56. These "other means" include expanding the responsibilities of local police,
peace officers, and sheriff's departments to include the apprehending and
transporting of individuals with serious mental illnesses to local hospitals for
psychiatric evaluations. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(h)(3), (n) (McKinney
1999) (detailing the extended responsibilities of police officers and members of the
sheriff's department).
57. See Elizabeth Dickinson Furlong, Coercion in the Community:
The
Application of Rogers Guardianship to Outpatient Commitment, 21 New Eng. J. on
Crim. & Civ. Confinement 485, 486 (1995); MadNation, Replacing Outpatient
Commitment Initiatives with Strategies that Work to Engage People in Need (visited
Jan. 21, 2000) <http://www.madnation.org/news/kendra/strategiesthatwork.htm>
[hereinafter Strategies that Work].
Such outpatient treatment may consist of
rehabilitation programs and therapy, as well as medication. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., A New Look at Treating the Mentally Ill, supra note 45 (discussing the
goals of the deinstitutionalization movement and community treatment).
59. See Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman, Law, Mental Health and Mental
Disorder 233 (1996); Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 59; see also N.Y. Mental
Hyg. Law § 9.60(a)(1) (describing categories of outpatient services that may be
ordered, such as medication, therapy, and/or case management).
60. See Health Policy Tracking Service, supra note 18 (summarizing states' use of
outpatient commitment laws).
61. Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-265 (1998) ("In no event may a
respondent ... meet[ing] the outpatient commitment criteria be physically forced to
take medication or forcibly detained for treatment pending a district court hearing."),
with N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(n) ("[I1f such assisted outpatient refuses to take
medications as required by the court order.., the director... may direct peace
officers... or police officers.., to take into custody" such person).
62. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-540(A)(1), (2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)
(maintaining that dangerous or "gravely disabled" patients may be ordered into
outpatient treatment, or a combination of inpatient and outpatient treatment); see
also N.D. Cent. Code § 25-03.1-21 (1995 & Supp. 1999) (discussing alternatives to
inpatient hospitalization for dangerous patients).
63. See Ala. Code § 22-52-10.2 (1975) (maintaining that an individual may be
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commitment statute, Kendra's Law, is among the most extreme in the
nation and carries the potential to reach practically any mentally ill
individual, regardless of whether she presents an immediate threat to
society. 64
B.

Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New York

Outpatient commitment, as a legal mechanism, forces the mentally
ill to comply with community treatment or face involuntary
hospitalization.' In the 1980s, New York was the only state that

explicitly prohibited outpatient commitment. 6 While other states
permitted involuntary outpatient care, few provided express statutory

procedures to govern such commitment.'
Rather, the decisionmaking power to commit an individual to outpatient treatment was
left to the unregulated and subjective judgment of physicians and
courts.68

By 1988, almost every state had enacted laws authorizing outpatient
commitment for the mentally il. 69 Most states established conditional
release, a statutory procedure sanctioning outpatient commitment as a
condition of discharge from inpatient facilities.7" Typically, if a patient
failed to adhere to treatment in this capacity, she would once again
become subject to involuntary hospitalization." Other states elected
committed on an outpatient basis if she is not dangerous, but rather -will, if not
treated ... continue to experience deterioration"); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 334-121
(Michie 1993) (prescribing involuntary outpatient commitment for patients
necessitating treatment in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration); N.Y. Mental
Hyg. Law § 9.60(c) (describing outpatient commitment and the criteria for courtordered treatment for individuals who are not imminently dangerous).
64. See MadNation, Seven Misconceptions About Kendra's Law, (visited Jan. 21,
2000) <http://www.madnation.orgnevslkendralmisconceptions.htm> [hereinafter
Seven Misconceptions].
65. See MadNation, Strategies that Work, supra note 57.
66. See GAP, supra note 13, at 65; Miller, supra note 26, at 211 (citing I. Keilitz &
T. Hall, State Statutes Governing Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commitment, 9 Mental
& Physical Disability L. Rep. 378-97 (1985)). While New York was the only state that
prohibited outpatient commitment, "only 26 states and the District of Columbia made
explicit provisions for it. The remaining 24 states neither explicitly prohibited nor
established procedures for outpatient commitments." Miller, supra note 26, at 211.
67. See Miller, supra note 26, at 210.
68. See id. at 210-11.
69. See Sales & Shuman, supra note 59, at 233.
70. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-540.01 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999)
(prescribing conditions necessary for ordering conditional outpatient treatment for
patients no longer requiring inpatient hospitalization); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135C:50 (1996) (authorizing outpatient treatment as a condition of discharge); see also
Miller, supra note 26, at 210 (describing the different types of outpatient commitment,
including conditional release).
71. See Marvin S. Swartz et al., New Directions in Research on Involutary
Outpatient Commitment, 46 Psychiatric Services, 381, 382 (1995).
However,
"[o]utpatient commitment differs from conditional release in that the court, rather
than treatment personnel, authorize[s] the commitment [procedure]." Weiner &
Wettstein, supra note 25, at 59. Furthermore, outpatient commitment is determined
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to use outpatient commitment in conjunction with, or as an alternative
to, inpatient commitment.7 2
In recent years, several states have significantly revised their
statutes by establishing less stringent criteria for compulsory
outpatient commitment.73 These modifications ultimately subject a
greater number of non-dangerous people who are psychologically
"deteriorating" to the treatment discretion of clinicians and courts.74
Many states have created a separate statutory framework empowering
courts to order outpatient commitment for individuals who may not
meet strict inpatient standards, but who, in the court's view, still
require community care.
Such laws target the large numbers of
mentally ill patients "cycling in and out of hospitals, living 76day to day
on the streets, or otherwise surviving on the social margin.

In 1994, New York enacted section 9.61 of the Mental Hygiene
Law, which established a pilot program for outpatient commitment of

the mentally ill. 77 This enactment was based on the recognition that
"[s]uch [a] program shall serve those patients who can benefit from
involuntary outpatient treatment 718 and "to assist the person in living
and

functioning in the community.

'79

Under

this program,

hospitalized individuals appeared before a judge to determine
whether they met the statutory criteria for court-ordered outpatient

commitment," which included a variety of services, such as case
at the initial commitment hearing, while conditional release occurs after the patient
has already been institutionalized. See Miller, supra note 26, at 210.
72. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-540 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999).
A. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed
patient, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to himself, is a danger
to others, is persistently or acutely disabled or is gravely disabled and in
need of treatment, and is either unwilling or unable to accept voluntary
treatment, the court shall order the patient to undergo one of the
following:
1. Treatment in a program of outpatient treatment.
2. Treatment in a program consisting of combined inpatient and
outpatient treatment.
C. The court may order the proposed patient to undergo outpatient or
combined inpatient and outpatient treatment ....
Id.
73. See Miller, supra note 26, at 217-18 (discussing outpatient commitment
statutes in North Carolina, Hawaii, and Arizona). These laws authorize outpatient
commitment for individuals who are not presently violent or imminently dangerous,
but are merely mentally ill and psychologically deteriorating. See id. at 218.
74. See Arrigo, supra note 42, at 209.
75. See John Petrila, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Forum: A Summary of
Issues and Research (Fiscal Year 1998-99) <http://www.fmhi.usf.edu/institute/pubs/
pdflmhlp/outpatient-forum-1999.pdf>; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
76. Arrigo, supra note 42, at 209.
77. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.61 (McKinney 1994).
78. Id. § 9.61(b).
79. Id. § 9.61(a).
80. See id. § 9.61(d-f) (detailing the procedure for involuntary outpatient
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management, therapy, and medication.8'

New York devised its pilot program to obviate the deterioration of
mentally ill individuals who were capable of surviving in the
This law set stringent and well-defined standards
community.'
establishing who was eligible for outpatient care, and under what
circumstances the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs
For example, only those individuals currently
was authorized.'
release were eligible for outpatient
approaching
hospitalized and

commitment.' 4 An application to obtain an order authorizing
involuntary outpatient treatment was to be initiated by the director of
the hospital in which the patient resided."- This application was to set
forth the criteria for outpatient treatment as delineated in the
statute 86 the facts that supported the director's belief that the patient
met the relevant criteria, and an affirmation by an examining
physician corroborating the need for outpatient commitmentY An
outpatient who failed to comply with such commitment, and required
immediate medical assistance, could ultimately be re-hospitalized. 8
Moreover, with regard to patients who met the specified outpatient
criteria, only those individuals clearly incapable of making treatment
decisions on their own were subjected to involuntary psychotropic
medication.' The program required courts to balance the interests of
commitment).
81. See id. § 9.61(a).
8Z See id.
83. Section 9.61(c) of the Mental Hygiene Law set out the criteria for involuntary
outpatient treatment:
(1) A patient may be ordered to obtain involuntary outpatient treatment if
the court finds that: (i) the patient is eighteen years of age or older, and (ii)
the patient is suffering from a mental illness; and (iii) the patient is incapable
of surviving safely in the community without supervision, based on a clinical
determination; and (iv) the patient is hospitalized at the hospital designated
pursuant to subdivision (b) of this section to take part in the pilot project ...
and (v) the patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment that
has necessitated involuntary hospitalization at least twice within the last
eighteen months; and (vi) the patient is, as a result of his or her mental
illness, unlikely to voluntarily participate in the recommended treatment
pursuant to the treatment plan; and (vii) in view of the patient's treatment
history and current behavior, the patient is in need of involuntary outpatient
treatment in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be
likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others.., and (viii) it is
likely that the patient will benefit from involuntary outpatient treatment;
and (ix) the involuntary outpatient treatment program of such hospital is
willing and able to provide the involuntary outpatient treatment ordered.
Id. § 9.61(c)(1) (emphasis added).
84. See id. § 9.61(c)(1)(iv).

85. See id. § 9.61 (d)(1).
86.
87.
88.
89.
A

See id. § 9.61(c).
See id § 9.61(d)(2)-(3).
See id § 9.61(k).
See id § 9.61(c)(2). This section stated:
court may order the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs as

2412

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the individual with those of the state before ordering such intrusive
medical treatment.' In addition, medication was to be administered
only after a judge had contemplated all relevant factors, including the
beneficial and detrimental effects of the drugs, and the dignity and
privacy rights of the patient. 9'

Despite its apparent utility, however, the pilot program was applied
infrequently, and by January 1999, only 198 patients received court
orders for outpatient commitment.' Furthermore, research studies
showed no difference in treatment outcomes between the recipients of
involuntary outpatient commitment and a control group that received
assistance on a voluntary basis. 93

In response to several high-profile crimes committed by the

mentally ill, 94 the New York legislature amended the pilot program in

1999, and passed Chapter 408 of the Mental Hygiene Law,"
commonly referred to as Kendra's Law. While the 1994 pilot program
allowed only hospital directors to petition the court for outpatient
commitment,96 Kendra's Law broadens this authority to include family
members, roommates, caregivers, local mental health officials and
qualified psychiatrists. 97 The petition must be accompanied by an
affidavit from an examining physician attesting to the severe nature of
the mental illness. 98 If patients fail to comply with outpatient
treatment, they can be transported to psychiatric hospitals for

part of an involuntary outpatient treatment program if the court finds the
hospital has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the patient lacks
the capacity to make a treatment decision as a result of mental illness and the
proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the
patient's liberty interest in refusing medication, taking into consideration all
relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interest, the benefits to
be gained from the treatment, the adverse side effects associated with the
treatment and any less intrusive alternative treatments.
Id. § 9.61(c)(2) (emphasis added).
90. See id.
91. See id. § 9.61(f)(2), (k)(2).
92. See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 18, at 3.
93. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 23 (maintaining that "[o]utpatient commitment
simply does not work").
94. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 3 (describing incidents where individuals were
injured by schizophrenics who refused to take medication); Fredric U. Dicker, State
Law Can Force Mentally Ill Into Hosp[ital],N.Y. Post, Nov. 20, 1999, at 3 (same). For
other examples of these tragic incidents, see Lynn Hicks, Critics: Commitment law
leaves some mentally ill untreated, Des Moines Reg., Oct. 19, 1999, at 1A. See also
supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing recent violent acts committed by
mentally ill individuals).
95. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60 (McKinney 1999).
96. See id. § 9.61(d) (McKinney 1994).
97. See id. § 9.60(e) (McKinney 1999). These informalities are quite similar to the
colloquial procedures of the mid-nineteenth century, which existed prior to the deinstitutionalization movement. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for
comparison.
98. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(e)(3).
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evaluation and subsequently hospitalized against their will."
Under Kendra's Law, individuals may be committed to outpatient
treatment if they meet all of the following criteria: (1) are eighteen
years of age or older; (2) have a mental illness; (3) are unlikely to
survive safely in the community without supervision; (4) have a
history of noncompliance with treatment (have been hospitalized or
violent in the past); (5) are unlikely to voluntarily participate in
treatment; (6) are in need of outpatient treatment to prevent relapse
or deterioration; and (7) are likely to benefit from outpatient
therapy."°
Kendra's Law thus lowers the standard of eligibility for outpatient
commitment. 10 ' New York's 1994 pilot program applied only to
individuals who were "incapable" of surviving in the community
without supervision.) 2 Furthermore, "capacity" was statutorily
defined as the "patient's ability to factually and rationally understand
and appreciate the nature and consequences of proposed
treatment."' 1 3 Kendra's Law has lessened this criterion from
"incapable" of surviving to "unlikely" to survive without
supervision."
Unfortunately for many persons affected by this
distinction, the term "unlikely" is not defined anywhere in the statute.
Similarly, while the 1994 pilot program reached only those patients
currently hospitalized, Kendra's Law has the potential to affect all
individuals suffering from severe mental illnesses, whether or not they

99. See id-§ 9.60(n).
100. See id § 9.60(c)(1)-(7).
101. Kendra's Law gives psychiatrists greater latitude in their subjective
determinations of persons eligible for outpatient treatment. Section 9.60(c) lists the
criteria for outpatient commitment. See id. Many of section 9.60's criteria for
outpatient commitment are identical to those listed in the 1994 pilot program statute.
However, there are a number of criteria that are different from those listed in the
previous pilot program, such as:
(3) The patient is unlikely to survive safely in the community without
supervision...
(4) The patient has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for
mental illness that has:
(i) at least twice within the last thirty-six months been a significant
factor in necessitating hospitalization ... or,
(ii) resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self
or others ....
Id. § 9.60(c)(3)-(4) (emphasis added).
102. Id. § 9.61(c)(iii) (McKinney 1994).
103. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, § 527.8(a)(2) (1995). While the
legislature is responsible for enacting general laws in New York State, it often
delegates rule-making powers to the state's administrative departments and agencies.
See id. at UG 1 (User's Guide). These agencies are then empowered to develop and
enforce the rules and regulations they find necessary to implement the broad policies
adopted by the legislature. See id The Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of
New York (NYCRR) is the official compilation of these rules, and courts must abide
by these policies. See id.
104. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(3) (McKinney 1999).
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have been previously institutionalized. 5
Despite the relative
infrequency with which the 1994 pilot program was used and the lack
of research assessing its effectiveness,106 Kendra's Law will be
enforced on a much larger segment of the population.
Kendra's Law is most controversial for its failure to delineate the
circumstances under which an outpatient can be involuntarily
medicated.107
New York courts require an adjudication of
incompetency before forcibly medicating an individual.'
The 1994
pilot program included such a standard in its text and clearly
established the conditions under which medication could be
dispensed."° Kendra's Law, however, does not explicitly require an
adjudication of incompetency before ordering involuntary medication.
A statute containing such nebulous standards leaves the mental health
care system open to inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement.
Moreover, without proper guidelines, Kendra's Law may curtail a
mental patient's constitutionally protected liberty and privacy
interests in making treatment decisions." 0 The next part examines the
constitutional issues underlying forced outpatient treatment laws and
their implications for patients' fundamental rights.
II. MENTALLY ILL INDIVIDUALS AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION

When antipsychotic drugs were introduced, they seemed to
eliminate many of the symptoms of psychoses. They were found to
abate hallucinations, agitation, delusions, and other psychotic
symptoms.' Not only did these drugs enable patients to live outside
hospital confines, but physicians also alleged that the drugs reduced
incidents of violence and disruption among patients who remained

105. See id. § 9.60(c)(4)(i)-(ii). Under Kendra's Law, an individual may be ordered
to undergo outpatient commitment if she has either been previously institutionalized
at least twice within the last thirty-six months or has engaged in serious violent
behavior within the past two years. See id.
106. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
107. Kendra's Law specifies only that medication is an acceptable mode of
treatment and that physicians must describe "the beneficial and detrimental physical
and mental effects of such medication." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(h)(4).
Moreover, if medication is authorized, the examining physician "shall recommend
whether such medication should be self-administered or administered by authorized
personnel." Id.
108. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 298-300 (1982) (recognizing a mental
patient's constitutional right to avoid the unwanted administration of psychotropic
drugs).
111. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 293. The decrease in the average length of
hospitalization has been attributed to the effectiveness of psychotropic drugs in
reducing the severity of psychotic incidents and elongating the interval between
relapses. See id.
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institutionalized." 2
However, "a dark side to these medications surfaced in the 1960s
and 1970s.""' Physicians quickly learned that antipsychotic drugs do
not cure mental illnesses, but rather alleviate and mask psychotic
symptoms, which usually return once the treatment is discontinued."'
In addition, these drugs plague a substantial number of patients with a
myriad of side effects, some of which are minimal and others that are
debilitating and occasionally fatal."5 While certain adverse effects are
apparent instantaneously, others arise only after prolonged
administration.1 6 In fact, scientific evidence suggests that "drug
therapy fosters hospital dependency and thus serves to increase the
likelihood of rehospitalization.""' 7 Amidst this climate of uncertainty
regarding the efficacy of antipsychotic drugs, advocates and reformers
began exploring the constitutional right of patients to refuse
involuntary medication. 18
The legal controversy underlying a law such as Kendra's Law
reflects a balancing of the state's interest in protecting the public from
harm with an individual's interest in refusing involuntary medication.
This part begins by discussing the constitutionally protected rights of
individuals to remain free from unwarranted governmental intrusions
in the area of forced medication. It then examines the two categories
of state interests at stake: the parens patriae authority and police
powers. This part concludes by demonstrating how courts have
balanced the interests of the individual against those of the state, with
an emphasis on New York procedures.
A. Court Decisions Establishingthe Right to Refitse Medication
One of the earliest legal arguments addressing the right to refuse
medical treatment was derived from the common law recognition of
individual freedom from "intentional [bodily] contacts.""' 9 The
common law action of battery developed out of the law's protection of
personal autonomy and bodily integrity.' -- Regulation of treatment
on this basis was historically consummated in two ways: criminal
112. See id.
113. Arrigo, supra note 42, at 80.
114. See Roederick C. White, Sr., What Right to Privacy? The Risk to the
Voluntary Mental Health Patient as a Result of Louisiana's Current Forcible
Medication Statute, 24 S.U. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1996).
115. Side effects include: drowsiness, seizures, cardiac irregularities, extrapyramidal
symptoms, akinesia (physical mobility), dyskinesia, tardive dyskinesia (irreversible
neurological disorder), and akathisia (motor restlessness). See id. at 30; Doudera &
Swazey, supra note 5, at 16; see also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 490 n.1 (1986)
(describing the most common side effects of antipsychotic drugs).
116. See Doudera & Swazey, supra note 5, at 13.
117. Cichon, supra note 5, at 295.
118. See Arrigo, supra note 42, at 80-83.
119. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968 (Colo. 1985).
120. See idL
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prosecutions for battery and civil proceedings for malpractice. 12' Both
of these remedies were premised on the notion that every individual
has an interest in physical security and freedom from restraint. 22 In
the context of involuntary medication today, however, criminal
prosecutions for battery are used quite sparingly, and tort suits have
not been a major factor in preventing unwanted treatment of the
mentally ill."2
The majority of effective legal attempts to combat forced
medication have utilized either state or federal constitutional
arguments. A number of litigants have relied upon such constitutional
protections as sources for the right to refuse involuntary medication,
including the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of thought
and expression.'24 More frequently, however, courts recognize an
individual's right to refuse medication on the basis of the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."2 This part will
discuss these constitutional protections in turn.
1. The First Amendment
The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech has provided a
foundation for challenging involuntary medication. 2 6 Although the
amendment expressly insulates "freedom of speech,"'127 the Supreme
Court has construed this clause to include other rights deemed
essential to free speech, such as "freedom of belief," "freedom of the
mind," or "freedom of thought."'" While the Supreme Court has yet
to consider the application of the First Amendment with regard to the
administration of psychotropic medication, several lower court
decisions "provide ample support for construing the First Amendment
to place limits on ...the more intrusive therapies.""9
121. See Miller, supra note 26, at 138.

122. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 314-15. These values of bodily integrity and selfdetermination are embedded in the "philosophy of Western Civilization." Id. at 314.
123. See Miller, supra note 26, at 138-39.
124. See infra Part II.A.1.
125. See infra Part II.A.2.
126. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech .....
U.S. Const. amend. I.
127. Id.
128. Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 135; see, e.g., Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds").
129. Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 135. Professor Winick

convincingly argues that "[m]ental processes must remain presumptively immune
from governmental control in a system committed to the values of the First
Amendment." Id. at 164. He points out that there is no definitive method for
"distinguishing 'normal from abnormal'... or 'sane from disordered thought."' Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Therefore, subjecting involuntary medication to First
Amendment scrutiny "erects a presumption against forced governmental intrusion
into the mind, one that may be overcome only on a showing of compelling necessity."
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Significantly, some lower courts have recognized a First
Amendment basis for refusing antipsychotic medication. These courts
have held that the First Amendment protects the communication of
ideas, which itself implies protection of the capacity to produce
ideas."0 Antipsychotic medication severely affects an individual's
ability to think and communicate, and thus hampers a patient's
exercise of her First Amendment rights."' Because these medications
directly alter mental capabilities, courts have maintained that
individuals have a First Amendment interest in avoiding unwanted
treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 32
Despite this reasoning, however, many courts hesitate to extend
First Amendment protection to cases involving unwanted medication.
For example, the district court in Rennie v. Klein'33 intimated that
involuntarily administering medication would infringe upon the First
Amendment, but nevertheless relied on the constitutional right to
privacy as the basis for refusal." Because the plaintiff, a hospitalized
mental patient, had asserted a desire to be cured and claimed a right
to medication, the Rennie court found that he waived any right to
assert a First Amendment objection to medical treatment. 35
Moreover, the court maintained that the drug's side effects were
"temporary and expected to last only a few days or a couple of
weeks," and therefore grounded the right to refuse medication in the
due process clause, rather than the First Amendment.' Others argue
that because antipsychotic drugs are "generally incapable of creating
thoughts, views, ideas... or of permanently inhibiting the process of
thought generation," they do not implicate basic First Amendment
values. 3 7
Furthermore, in view of the beneficial effects that
medication has on mental processes, it may be paradoxical to view
such drugs as an intrusion that impels First Amendment scrutiny."
Finally, patients' reactions to psychotropic medication depend on
Id. at 165.

130. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that
psychotropic drugs can affect one's ability to think and communicate); Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 933 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (noting that forced

administration

of medication "implicates a person's interest in being able to think and to
communicate freely"); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979)

(maintaining that the power to produce ideas is fundamental to the right to

communicate and is entitled to constitutional protection), affd in part, rev'd in part,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
131. See supra note 130.
132- See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 1998); Bee, 744 F.2d

at 1393-94 (recognizing that the right to refuse antipsychotic medication is protected
by the First Amendment, which implicitly protects the capacity to produce ideas).
133. 462 F. Supp 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).

134. See id. at 1144.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 1147.

137. Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 174 (citation omitted).

138. See id.
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their unique physical make-up, dosage, and the duration of drug
use. 139 Thus, the First Amendment's applicability will depend in part
on the "evidentiary showing of the drugs' potential side effects" in

each individual case. 140 Being entirely fact-specific, courts prefer to
apply a due process analysis, which focuses on the general
intrusiveness of treatment, rather than on the specific reactions of a
particular patient.

2.

Due Process and the Right to Refuse Medication

The Supreme Court has never specifically explicated the extent of
due process protection for mental patients who wish to refuse

antipsychotic medication.1 41 While the Court has confirmed that
mentally ill individuals have a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
psychotropic drugs, 142 the Court has left states with the responsibility
of striking a balance between individual rights and the state's interest
in protecting the health and safety of its citizens. 4 3 As a result, the
laws regarding outpatients' rights to refuse medication vary from state
to state.
a. The Supreme Court and the FourteenthAmendment

The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the Government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.'" In the American system of
government, which embraces notions of autonomy and free choice,
every individual retains a constitutionally protected right to remain
free from unwanted bodily interference.' 45 This right has been cast in
139. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 326.
140. Id.
141. See Deborah A. Dorfman & Michael L. Perlin, Is it More than "Dodging
Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the
Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refiise Treatment Cases, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y
& L. 114, 122 (1996).
142. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) (maintaining that "the
Constitution recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs" in the hospital context).
143. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
144. See U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV, § 1. In the early 1800s, due process was
viewed primarily as procedural, and its implications were rather limited in scope. See
Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 189-90. Substantive due process
theory began to develop prior to the Civil War with the rise of natural rights
philosophy. See id. at 190. After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the
notion that the due process clauses imposed both substantive and procedural limits on
the government was widely accepted by courts. See id. at 191.
145. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (holding that the
residents of mental retardation facilities have a liberty interest in personal security
and reasonably safe conditions of confinement); Mills, 457 U.S. at 299 (maintaining
that both voluntary and involuntary mental hospital patients have a constitutionally
recognized liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
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variegated terms, often depending on the type of proposed
governmental action at issue, but includes a liberty interest in bodily
integrity,"4 freedom from restraint, 47 and the right to privacy." s
Furthermore, this right extends uniformly to all individuals," 9
including those suffering from mental illnesses.
Due process challenges may be scrutinized under either a strict
scrutiny, 5 ' intermediate tier,' or rational basis'5 standard of review.
In the context of involuntary medication, as the intrusiveness of the

government's action rises, the stronger the justification must be to

override that interest.153 Deciding the appropriate standard of review
medication); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,494 (1980) (implicating a liberty interest by
transferring prisoner to a mental hospital for psychiatric treatment, including
psychotropic drugs).
146. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (upholding a
compelled blood test of a suspected intoxicated driver against constitutional attack,
but recognizing that more substantial intrusions may be treated differently).
147. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316 (holding that the "core of the liberty
protected by the due process clause" is implicated by subjecting residents of mental
retardation facilities to physical restraints (citation omitted)).
148. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (maintaining that an
involuntary surgical operation to remove a bullet from a suspect charged with
attempted robbery entailed a severe intrusion on that individual's sense of personal
privacy). But see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7
(1990) ("Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held.
We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest."). Such classification suggests that the Court is unwilling to grant
"fundamental" status to the right to refuse medication, because while the rights
encompassed within the privacy doctrine are "fundamental," certain liberty interests
may be outweighed by a mere rational governmental interest.
149. See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (deciding that
plaintiffs in civil injury suits may not be forced to submit to surgical examinations and
that "[n]o right is held more sacred... than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference with
others" (emphasis added)).
150. Government action that implicates a fundamental right, including rights to
reproduction, marriage, contraception, and abortion, must be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); see
also 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law:
Substance and Procedure § 18.3, at 216-21 (3d ed. 1999) (analyzing the standards of
review that courts apply to due process challenges).
151. The Supreme Court has adopted an intermediate standard of review that is
not as onerous as the strict scrutiny test, but which involves less deference to the
legislature than does rational basis review. See Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 150, §
18.3, at 218-21.
152. Government action that does not burden a fundamental right will survive a
due process challenge if the government can prove that it rationally relates to a
legitimate governmental interest. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 957 (6th
Cir. 1998).
153. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 331-32; see also Winick, Mental Health
Treatment, supra note 22, at 284 ("In scrutinizing governmental interests asserted to
justify involuntary treatment, courts inevitably engage in a balancing of the interests
of the state and of the individual, and the balance is struck differently in different
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is crucial, because the ultimate disposition in a case is often shaped by
the standard applied.
As of yet, the Supreme Court has not held that the right to refuse
involuntary medication is "fundamental,"'-' which would thereby
subject the state to a "strict scrutiny" standard of review. The Court
has instead adopted manifold levels of review, depending on the
context in which the due process challenge is brought. 55 In
Washington v. Harper,156 the Court held that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a convicted prisoner has a significant liberty interest in
avoiding involuntary psychotropic medication; however, it determined
that this due process right is not absolute. 157 This constitutional right
may be infringed upon by the state when a mentally ill inmate poses a
substantial threat to herself or others. 58 The Supreme Court adopted
a low standard of review and maintained that an invasion of
constitutional rights pursuant to prison regulations may be justified if
"reasonably related" to a legitimate penological objective.159 In
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that prisons must be able
to ensure safety and order within the facility.
The implications of the Harper decision were colossal. First,
Harper rejected the supposition that the right of prison inmates to
refuse treatment was "fundamental."'1' 6 Rather, the Court applied a
"standard of reasonableness" in evaluating the constitutionality of a
prison policy which authorized the involuntary medicating of
Second, by applying a less rigid
dangerous inmates.'
"reasonableness" test, the Court rejected the least restrictive
alternative principle, 162 which would have required a showing that the
particular therapy in question was necessary to accomplish a
contexts.").
154. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (deciding that the Fourteenth
Amendment affords pre-trial detainees at least as much protection as the
"reasonableness" standard); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) (noting
that a prisoner's right to avoid unwanted medication is judged "under a
'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights." (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,349 (1987)).
155. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 284. "The level of
scrutiny to be applied in the circumstances-strict, intermediate, or low level-tells
courts performing this constitutional balancing how to weigh the competing state and
individual interests." Id.
156. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
157. See id. at 221-22, 228.
158. See id. at 221-22. If a prisoner is not an imminent threat, however, the right to
refuse medication may not be infringed. See id.
159. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). The Court adopted a deferential approach to
reviewing the discretion of prison authorities in dealing with problems of institutional
security. See id. at 223-24.
160. See id.

161. Id.
162 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. If the rights were deemed
"fundamental," the Court would have applied a more stringent standard of review.
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compelling governmental interest."6 Whether this lower level of
scrutiny would apply beyond the prison context to include all cases
involving involuntary medication remained unclear after Harper.t 4
The Court's decision in Riggins v. Nevada,"6 however, dissipated the
notion that Harperwould be construed broadly.
Riggins involved a dangerous pretrial detainee-an unconvicted
individual held in prison while awaiting trial." Although the Court
again resisted adopting a strict scrutiny standard of review,"6 it did
indicate that the state must make a "compelling" showing that the
medication is both necessary to prevent an imminent threat and is the
least restrictive means to accomplish its objective." The Court thus
tempered the Harper decision by suggesting that outside the context
of convicted prisoners, the right to refuse medical treatment will be
accorded more leeway. 69
Harper and Riggins leave the constitutional issues raised by
involuntary medical treatment outside the prison realm substantially
unresolved, and provide little guidance as to how to analyze an
asserted right to refuse treatment. Because the right to refuse
medication in an outpatient setting has not yet been examined by the
Supreme Court, the status of persons ordered into outpatient
treatment, who are neither prisoners nor pretrial detainees, remains
unclear. As such, outpatients undergoing involuntary medication
should at least be afforded the equivalent level of protection as the
defendants in Riggins, which would require the state to demonstrate a
compelling interest and the least restrictive means of fulfilling that
interest. 170
163. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
164. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 272.
165. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
166. See id. at 129-30.
167. See id. at 136. "Contrary to the dissent's understanding, we do not 'adopt a
standard of strict scrutiny."' Id. (emphasis added).
168. See id at 135-36; see also Sales & Shuman, supra note 59, at 264 (discussing the
standards proposed by the Supreme Court in "right-to-refuse" medication cases);
White, supra note 114, at 16 n.80 (same).
169. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 278-79. The Supreme
Court in Mills v. Rogers also expressed its assumption that involuntarily administered
antipsychotic drugs intrude on a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982). In Mills, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the involuntary use of psychotropic drugs for civil
patients at the Boston State Hospital. See id. at 293-94. After briefing and oral
argument, however, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of an intervening decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts that recognized a right to refuse medication on state law grounds. See
id. at 303, 306 (remanding the case in the wake of ln re Guardianship of Roe, 421
N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981), and therefore failing to determine which level of scrutiny is
appropriate in involuntary commitment cases).
170. See White, supra note 114, at 16 n.80. The author argues that because these
individuals are not criminals, they should be entitled to "at least as much protection as
that accorded pretrial detainees." Id.
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Moreover, mentally ill outpatients may be deserving of an even
higher level of scrutiny. Under liberal statutes such as Kendra's Law,
participants in outpatient commitment programs are neither
imminently dangerous nor incapable of making informed decisions to
refuse medication. 7' Arguably, the exigencies invoked by the Harper
Court to justify deference in the forcible administration of medication
to control violence are often not present in the community setting.
Therefore, outpatients would appear to be entitled to the most
exacting standard of review, and are thus deserving of strict judicial
scrutiny.
In addition, since the reform movement of the mid-1960s, courts
have repeatedly distinguished between the rights of criminals and the
mentally ill.172 This criminal-civil distinction suggests that the
limitations placed on a prisoner's right to refuse medication are not
automatically applicable to civil patients. 173 As the Court in Harper
emphasized, "[t]here are few cases in which the State's interest in
combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is
greater than in a prison environment,"'7 4 and the state "under other
circumstances would have been required to satisfy a more rigorous
standard of review."'7 5 This reasoning leads to the belief that the
interest of a mental patient is at least as great, and in fact greater, than
a prisoner's right to avoid antipsychotic medication.
b. Lower Courts and the Right to Refuse Medication
Lower courts have recognized the right to refuse antipsychotic
medication on the basis of both federal and state constitutional due
process clauses. Because outpatient commitment laws are of recent
vintage, there exists little case law addressing the extent of due
process protections for civilly committed outpatients. However, lower
court decisions in the area of inpatient commitment indicate a
growing trend toward greater individual autonomy and more stringent
limitations on governmental intrusions. The first two landmark cases
implicating the right to refuse treatment in an inpatient context arose
in the federal courts of New Jersey and Massachusetts. 176 These cases
171. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c), (o) (McKinney 1999).
172 See Stransky, supra note 48, at 432.
173. See id.
174. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,225 (1990).
175. Id. at 223.
176. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), remanded, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 322 (1982), which limited an individual's liberty interest according to the
professional judgment of institutional staff); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352
(D. Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated &
remanded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 306 (1982) (remanding case in light
of In re Guardianship of Roe, which recognized liberty interests according to
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relied solely upon the substantive liberty interests provided by the
federal constitution. While in juxtaposition these cases differ
significantly in their facts and holdings, both courts recognized a
constitutional right to refuse involuntary medication."
In the first of these landmark decisions, the district court in Rogers
v. Okin17 8 recognized a state police power justification for the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.' The Rogers
court held that involuntarily committed patients may be forcibly
medicated in emergency situations "in which a failure to do so would
result in a substantial likelihood of physical harm."" On appeal, the
First Circuit broadened the definition of "emergency" to include
predictions of future violence and possible psychological
deterioration.18 '
Rennie v. Klein,l" which arose in the same period as Rogers, was the
first case to address the issue of a patient's right to refuse psychotropic
drugs in a non-emergency situation. In Rennie, the court examined
New Jersey's administrative regulations governing medication refusals
by hospitalized patients.1' 8 The Third Circuit maintained that forcibly
medicating a patient over her objection in a non-emergency situation
infringes on that patient's liberty interest.'8 However, the court held
that antipsychotic drugs could be administered "whenever, in the
exercise of [a treating clinician's] professional judgment, such an
action is deemed necessary to prevent the patient from endangering
himself or others. '' s"
Both Rogers and Rennie have served as models for other state and
federal courts ordering involuntary medication of hospitalized
patients." Subsequent cases have uniformly held that patients have a
protected liberty interest in deciding whether to take antipsychotic
medication.Y This liberty interest has been defined as a substantial
Massachusetts state law, rather than the federal constitution).
177. See Rennie, 653 F.2d at 838; Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1365.
178. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
179. See id. at 1365.
180. Id.
181. See Rogers, 634 F.2d at 654-56.
182. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
183. See id. at 840.
184. See Rennie, 720 F.2d 266,269 (3d Cir. 1983).
185. Id.
186. See Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 125. These decisions provide two
models of the right of civilly committed patients to refuse antipsychotic medication in
both emergency and non-emergency situations.
187. See, e.g., Large v. Superior Ct., 714 P.2d 399, 407 (Ariz. 1986) (maintaining
that competent adult cannot be involuntarily medicated in a non-emergency
situation); Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570, 571 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (same); People
v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 963-64 (Colo. 1985) (declaring that even incompetent
persons do not automatically lose their right to refuse medication, but rather a judge
weighs various factors to make that determination); Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977) (grounding the right to refuse medication
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right to be free from unwarranted intrusions upon an individual's
personal security.' 88 In the United States, notions of liberty are
inextricably intertwined with the idea of physical freedom and selfdetermination, and therefore, courts have often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the
due process clause." 9
Moreover, it is a well-established principle that substantive rights
provided by the federal constitution define only minimum protections
that individuals must be afforded.Y Thus, states are free to extend
greater protections when they so desire. As one commentator notes:
"federal courts appear[] to be moving away from the extension of
individual rights based on the federal constitution, and toward a
federalist policy of permitting states to set their own courses in the
area of such rights."19 ' Similar to the federal constitution, state
constitutional due process clauses have been held to afford a right to
refuse medication.Y State law may also recognize liberty interests
more extensively than does the federal constitution, 93 and ultimately
state law will be applied to ensure the fullest protection of individual
autonomy and freedom from governmental interference. 9 4
States not only recognize individual liberty interests, but have also
surpassed the Supreme Court" and have grounded the right to refuse
medication in their state constitutions' right to privacy. 9 6 In
on a constitutional right to privacy); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492-93 (1986)
(holding that involuntarily committed mental patients have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing medication).
188. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484, 488-89 (N.H. 1983) (holding
that because antipsychotic drugs have drastic effects upon one's physical well-being,
they significantly intrude upon an individual's security and liberty interests).
189. See supra note 187.

190.
(1980);
191.
192.

See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488
In re New York Presbyterian Hosp., 693 N.Y.S.2d 405,409 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
Miller, supra note 26, at 144-45.
See Large, 714 P.2d at 406; In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 n.9

(Mass. 1981); Opinion of the Justices,465 A.2d at 488; Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492-93.

193. See Mills, 457 U.S. at 300. "If the state interest is broader, the substantive
protection that the Constitution affords against the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs would not determine the actual substantive rights and duties of
persons in the State of Massachusetts." Id. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
194. See, e.g., In re Gordon, 619 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (applying New
York's due process clause (rather than the federal due process clause), which insures
greater protection to an individual's "furtherance of his own desires"); Weiner &
Wettstein, supra note 25, at 47.
195. See supra note 148 (citing the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, which limited the scope of the privacy doctrine in the
right-to-refuse treatment context).
196. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp 915, 932-33 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Hondroulis
v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 415 (La. 1989) (maintaining that the state
constitution expressly guarantees that each individual has an affirmative 'right to
privacy'); In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 n.9 (Mass. 1981) (same);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27 (same); see also Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830,
832 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (finding that involuntary administration of psychotropic
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Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,197 for example, the Louisiana court
maintained that its state constitution "expressly guarantees that every
person shall be secure... against unreasonable 'invasions of
privacy."' 198 Treatment with psychotropic drugs not only impacts the
patient's bodily integrity, but also the individual's mind, which is the
"quintessential zone of human privacy."' 199 Furthermore, psychotropic
medication is a direct governmental intrusion into mental processes
and "[i]nvades the innermost privacy of the individual and cuts off the
right of expression at its source." 2' Because psychotropic medication
by its very nature alters mental processes, both in its primary effects
and in certain side effects, 2 1 these drugs are deemed to implicate the
right to mental privacy. Thus, both the Supreme Court and lower
courts, while not always agreeing on the source or extent of the
constitutional right to avoid involuntary medication, have established
a mentally ill patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs in certain
contexts. The next section discusses how courts balance the
constitutional rights of mentally ill individuals against the
government's interests in protecting society at large.
B. Balancing an Individual'sConstitutionallyProtectedInterest with
the Government's Reasons for Infringement
Even when a constitutional source is relied upon to support a
patient's refusal of antipsychotic medication, there is no guarantee
that the refusal will be upheld. Constitutional rights are not absolute,
but rather are balanced against the government's interests in
protecting and caring for individuals.z' Courts have identified two
governmental interests which, under appropriate circumstances,
justify the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication3The first is the government's police power interest" in preventing
medication amounts to an unwarranted governmental intrusion and is in violation of
an individual's privacy rights).
197. 553 So. 2d 398.
19& Id.at 415.
199. Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Nonconsensual Treatment of Involuntarily
Committed Mentally Ill Persons with Neuroleptic or Antipsychotic Drugs as Violative
of State Constitutional Guaranty, 74 A.L.R.4th § 5, 1099, 1108 (1989) (citation
omitted).
200. Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 144 (quoting T. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 64 (Random House ed. 1966)).
201. Psychotropic medication seeks to influence psychological conditions through
the use of chemical interventions that affect the mind, behavior, and intellectual
functions. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 61 n.3; supra notes
111-17 and accompanying text.
202. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 331-45.
203. See Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 47; John Kip Cornwell,
Understandingthe Role of the Police and Parens PatriaePowers in Involuntary Civil
Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L 377. 377-96
(1998) (discussing the history of the police power and parens patriae doctrines).
204. See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
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patients from endangering themselves or others. The second is the
state's parens patriae authority25 to care for citizens who are unable
to care for themselves. Because these powers are deemed inherent in
the rights of sovereignty, "courts and clinicolegal tribunals invoke the
doctrine of paternalism to justify the 'massive deprivation
of liberty'
206
which affects the lives of mentally disordered persons.
When scrutinizing the governmental interests asserted to justify
involuntary medication, courts inevitably balance the interests of the
state with those of the individual. At a minimum, governmental
infringement of an individual's protected liberty or privacy interest
must be "reasonably related to legitimate government objectives."20 7

Highly intrusive conduct must be supported by a compelling
governmental interest and a showing that there are no less intrusive
means available to accomplish the state's objective.2 8 Courts have
placed even further limitations on governmental authority in the
context of involuntary medical treatment of hospitalized patients.2 9
Today, states can authorize the forcible administration of medication

to inpatients in only two situations: (i) during an emergency, and (ii)
when an individual lacks the capacity to control her treatment
regimen. Logically, these same limitations should also extend to
protect outpatients from unwarranted medication.
1. Emergency Situations Where the State's Police Power Interest Is
Authorized
Every individual "'of adult years and sound mind has the right to
determine what shall be done with his own body'... and to control
the course of his medical treatment." 10 Recognition of this right to
205. See infra notes 229-53 and accompanying text.
206. Arrigo, supra note 42, at 143 (citation omitted). This paternalistic analysis is
consistent with the utilitarian view of involuntary treatment. Clinicians who adopt
this approach view the morality of coercive treatment by the extent to which it serves
the greater good of the individual, society, or both. See Marvin S. Swartz et al., The
Ethical Challenges of a Randomized Controlled Trial of Involuntary Outpatient
Commitment, J. Behav. Health Services & Res. 35, 37 (Winter 1997) [hereinafter
Swartz et al., The Ethical Challenges]. Physicians often regard treatment, even if
involuntary, as the "sine qua non of restored functioning and meaningful autonomy."
Id. In contrast to the utilitarian approach, the deontological perspective views means
as "more important than ends and maintains that ...the infringement of liberty or
damage to the dignity of the individual... may, in and of itself, be unacceptable,
regardless of the ultimate good served by this form of 'benevolent coercion."' Id.
207. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (holding that patients
committed to a state mental institution possess certain liberty interests that can be
overridden simply by a court's showing that professional judgment was exercised).
208. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-38 (1992); Schmerber v. California.
384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
209. In New York, these limitations have been codified in the Official Compilation
of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York (NYCRR). See supra note
103 for a more detailed description of the NYCRR.
210. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,492 (1986) (citations omitted).
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refuse medication is consistent with existing medical mores and
philosophies.21 1 The right to reject medical treatment, however, is not
absolute and must occasionally yield to compelling state interests.2t 2
Governmental officials exercise broad discretion through their
police powers to protect public health, safety, welfare, and moral
behavior.213 In certain situations, the state may utilize this police
power authority to involuntarily restrain mentally ill patients in
hospital settings.2 1 4 The state's police power stems from its legitimate
interest in preventing the mentally ill from harming themselves or
others.2 This principle of "societal self-defense" has been applied
ubiquitously to restrain any person who endangers the safety of
others.216

After hospitalization, however, courts have set limits on a state's
ability to involuntarily medicate a patient under its police power
authority.2 17 The scope of the government's police power has been
defined in terms of either an "emergency" or "dangerousness"
standard, or both.21 While courts apply these labels interchangeably,
211. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977). "[S]uch a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical
profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's
interest in protecting the same." Id at 426-27.
212 See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495; see also Inre Storar, 52 N.Y2d 363, 377 (1981)
("The State has a legitimate interest in protecting the lives of its citizens. It may
require that they submit to medical procedures in order to eliminate a health threat to
the community.").
213. See Cornwell, supra note 203, at 390.
214. See id States have exercised police powers since the colonial period to protect
the community from the violent tendencies of the mentally ill. See id. at 389.
215. See id.
216. See id at 390.
For example, courts have distinctly recognized the
Government's authority to enact quarantine laws, and "health laws of every
description," which relate to the protection of public safety. See, e.g., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) ("According to settled principles the police
power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the
public safety.").
217. In New York, for example, the state can only use its police power to medicate
an individual who is imminently dangerous. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495-96. When
the only indication of dangerousness is the commission of a nonviolent or minor crime
that does not place the individual or others in immediate danger, the individual's
constitutional right to refuse medication outweighs the state's interest.
218. See Cichon, supra note 5, at 337; cf O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (finding that a patient cannot be involuntarily committed if she is
nondangerous, but failing to directly address whether "dangerousness" is a prerequisite for civil commitment). In this case, the Court balanced the patient's interest
in refusing medication against the state's parens patriae authority, rather than its
police power. The Court held that a "State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends." Id. at
576. Although the Supreme Court did not acknowledge that "dangerousness" is a
pre-requisite for commitment, virtually all states statutorily require that an individual
be either a danger to himself or to others as a necessary criterion for
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there is a "major difference in scope between the[se] underlying
standards. 2 19 Emergency authority is limited to situations in which
the threat of physical violence is immediate 2 A "dangerousness"
standard authorizes involuntary drugging on the prediction that a
patient will deteriorate and present a future threat of violence if not

medicated.2 '
The majority of courts, including New York, apply the "emergency"
standard, and require that the harm to be prevented have a high
degree of imminence before forcibly medicating involuntary
patients. 222 In an emergency, the state may thus be empowered in the
exercise of its police power to involuntarily administer psychotropic
medication to patients until the emergency subsides. 2 23 New York
courts have recognized the need for emergency medical treatment of a
competent individual who is "presently dangerous. '224 This state
exists when a mentally ill individual engages in conduct or is
imminently likely to engage in conduct that poses a risk of physical
harm to herself or others.2z Unlike other jurisdictions, New York
does not require that an individual commit a "recent overt act ' 226 as
evidence of imminence. 227 Rather, for medication to be ordered, the
court need only find that an individual is "substantially likely" to
cause injury or bodily harm.22 s
2.

Incompetent Patients and the State's Parens Patriae Authority To
Order Involuntary Medication
Parens patriae, which literally means "parent of the country,

221

institutionalization. See Miller, supra note 26, at 19.
219. Cichon, supra note 5, at 337.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 338; see, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 659-60 (1st Cir. 1980)
(applying a flexible definition of an "emergency" to prevent deterioration for patients
at Boston State Hospital who claimed that their constitutional rights were being
violated when they were involuntarily medicated).
222. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496 (defining an emergency as "imminent danger to a
patient or others in the immediate vicinity"); see also Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570,
573 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that an emergency situation is "an immediate threat
of physical injury"); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d
308, 321 n.25 (Mass. 1983) (maintaining that an emergency calls for "immediate
action"); Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 295.
223. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496.
224. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, § 527.8(c)(4)(i) (1995).
225. See id. § 527.8(a)(4).
226. A recent overt act is unruly conduct or an act of violence committed by the
individual before forced medication may be imposed. While New York does not
require an overt act as proof of an "emergency," other states necessitate that this
element be proven before ordering medical treatment. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 373-1(9.1) (1999); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.01(17) (West 1998); N.D. Cent. Code § 2503.1-34(5) (1995); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 7301(b) (West 1999).
227. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, § 527.8(c)(4)(i).
228. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.01 (McKinney 1994).
229. Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 47.

2000]

KENDRA'S LAW

2429

refers to the role of the state as a sovereign and guardian of persons
legally incapable of caring for themselves.-'

Grounded in principles

of beneficence, the parens patriae authority permits states to provide
treatment to citizens who are unable to make their own decisions due

to their mental illnesses? - As the Supreme Court has stated, "[tihe
classic example of this role is when a State undertakes to act as 'the

general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics."' a 2 This capacious
philosophy historically served as a justification for expeditious
commitment and treatment, a goal consistent with the predeinstitutionalization belief that hospitals were best able to manage
the mentally ill. 33 Thus, in order to administer medication by force,
an individual must be found to be incompetent to function or unable
to make medical decisions.
Prior to the civil rights movement, psychiatric patients were deemed
"globally incompetent by virtue of their hospitalizations."' ' Today,
however, both clinicians and courts maintain that mental illness
strikes only limited areas of functioning, leaving other regions of the
mind unimpaired.'-' Moreover, the Supreme Court in Mills v.
Rogers236 found a distinction between the standards governing
involuntary commitment and those applying to incompetencyY7
Thus, it is now acknowledged that many mentally ill individuals retain
the capacity to function in a competent manner and to control their
treatment regimens? -8
230. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 289; see also Black's
Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1991) (defining "parens patriae").
231. See Cornwell, supra note 203, at 377.
232. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
233. See Cornwell, supra note 203, at 381.
234. Miller, supra note 26, at 138.
235. See Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 494 (1986); see also N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law
§ 9.60(o) (McKinney 1999) ("The determination by a court that a patient is in need of
assisted outpatient treatment under this section shall not be construed as or deemed
to be a determination that such patient is incapacitated [for purposes of guardianship
appointment]."). The appointment of a guardian is necessary to provide for the
personal needs of that person, "including food, clothing, shelter, health care, or safety
and/or to manage the property and financial affairs of that person." N.Y. Mental Hyg.
Law § 81.02(a) (McKinney 1996). "Incapacity" is determined by the person's inability
to provide for his personal needs and/or property management and inability to
understand and appreciate the consequences of such inability. See id. § 81.02(b). The
fact that an outpatient under Kendra's Law need not be deemed -incapacitated"
reflects an understanding that mental illness is not synonymous with incompetency.
236. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
237. See id. at 297. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has likewise held
that civil commitment fails to raise a presumption of incompetence. See Winters v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971).
238. Under New York law, "mental illness" is defined as "an affliction with a
mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance
in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the person afflicted
requires care, treatment and rehabilitation." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 1.03(20). This
definition in no way implies that a mentally ill person is also incapacitated. The clear
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Today, courts consistently maintain that psychiatric patients are
entitled to the same protections as other individuals when seeking or
refusing medical treatment. 39 New York courts, in particular, have
held that a finding of mental illness does not raise a presumption that
a patient is incompetent to make decisions regarding medical
treatment. 240

Hence, absent a determination of incompetency, the

forcible administration of medication to a competent individual in a
non-emergency situation violates her liberty interests in bodily

integrity, personal security, and the right to privacy. 241 On balance,
the right to self-determination generally outweighs any countervailing
state interests, and competent individuals are permitted to refuse
medication, even at the risk of death.
While the parens patriae philosophy purports to be in the best
interests of the individual and society as a whole,24 2 such coercive
treatment raises fundamental questions of liberty, dignity, and justice

that may override the state's interest. 243 The court in Project Release

v. Prevost24 held that diminished mental capacity alone cannot
undermine the due process protections afforded to individuals.245 In
order to justify treatment that invades fundamental constitutional
rights, the patient's incompetency must be separately demonstrated in
a manner that meets the requirements of procedural due process.

6

trend in the law is to distinguish between mental illness and incapacity. See infra note
246 for examples of courts that require a separate adjudication of incompetency
before ordering involuntary commitment.
239. See, e.g., Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (detailing
the rights of involuntary committed patients to refuse medication); Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d
at 492 (finding that every individual has the right to control the course of her medical
treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Mass.
1977) (maintaining that individual autonomy applies equally to mentally ill patients
who should not be treated with less dignity or status due to their illnesses).
240. See Winters, 446 F.2d at 70-71; see also Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495 ("[T]here is
ample evidence that many patients, despite their mental illness are capable of making
rational and knowledgeable decisions about medications. The fact that a mental
patient may disagree with the psychiatrist's judgment about the benefit of medication
outweighing the cost does not make the patient's decision incompetent." (internal
quotations omitted)).
241. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 977-79 (2d Cir. 1983). Absent an
overwhelming state interest, such as an emergency, a competent person has the right
to refuse such treatment. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass.
1981). "To deny this right to persons who are incapable ... is to degrade those whose
disabilities make them wholly reliant on other, more fortunate, individuals." Id.
242. See Arrigo, supra note 42, at 139. The author points to three paternalistic
values underscoring institutionalization: social control, custody, and treatment. See id.
at 139-43.
243. See, e.g., Swartz et al., The Ethical Challenges, supra note 206, at 37 (discussing
the ethical implications of coercion with respect to mental health).
244. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
245. See id. at 971.
246. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 298-302 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Project Release, 722 F.2d at 980-81; Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d
65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1971); Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570, 578-79 (Ariz. Ct. App.
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Moreover, even after a person is deemed incompetent, she does not
forfeit her protected liberty interest to refuse unwanted medication.
Rather, the individual remains entitled to have her "substituted

'
judgment"247
exercised on her behalf.2 The substituted judgment
standard is premised on the notion that the freedom of selfdetermination should not be lost merely because an individual is

incompetent. 4 9

The standard thus requires courts to draw two

conclusions before forcibly administering medication.First, the
party seeking the treatment order must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the patient is incompetent. " Second, the
court must determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly
tailored to give substantive effect to a patient's liberty interest 521
Therefore, even when a person is deemed incompetent, the judge is
required to weigh relevant factors before determining if medication is
in the best interests of the ward.5 3

Undoubtedly, institutionalized mental patients retain constitutional
liberty and privacy rights to refuse antipsychotic medication.
Furthermore, the government may infringe upon these rights only in
an emergency or when the mental patient is deemed incompetent.
The next part examines how these interests should be balanced in the

1982); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961,973 (Colo. 1985).
247. Under the "substituted judgment" standard, courts weigh the individual's
values and preferences to determine whether she would choose treatment if
competent. See Beis, supra note 25, at 157. "[T]he doctrine in its original inception
called on the court to 'don the mental mantle of the incompetent."' Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,431 (Mass. 1977) (citation omitted).
248. See Mills, 457 U.S. at 301-02 (requiring that a court take into consideration a
variety of factors before administering psychotropic drugs). These factors include:
(1) the ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment: (2) her religious beliefs; (3)
the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability of adverse side effects: (5) the
consequences if treatment is refused; and (6) the prognosis with treatment. See id. at
302 n.19 (citing In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 57 (Mass. 1981)).
249. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 273 (1990);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431; Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 347
n.10.
250. See Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497 (1986).
251. See id.; see also Medina, 705 P.2d at 973 (maintaining that the patient's
incompetency must be established before the state can administer antipsychotic
medication to a nonconsenting mental patient,): Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d
484,489 (N.H. 1983) (same).
252. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497. This includes taking into consideration the
patient's best interests, benefits and detriments from treatment, and less intrusive
alternatives. See id at 497-98.
253. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 56-57. Another court also
maintained:
[I]t cannot be said that it is always in the 'best interests' of the ward to
require submission to such treatment.... To presume that the incompetent
person must always be subjected to what many rational and intelligent
persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the incompetent person by
placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality.
Saikowicz, 370 N.E.2d. at 428.
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context of involuntary outpatient commitment.
III. THE CONTROVERSY

OVER KENDRA'S

LAW

This part presents the arguments in support of and in opposition to
involuntary outpatient commitment, with a concentration on New
York's outpatient treatment statute, Kendra's Law. This part argues
that as enacted, Kendra's Law violates both federal and state
constitutional liberty interests, freedom of expression, and the
individual right to privacy. Kendra's Law is also irreconcilable with
the least restrictive alternative principle. Furthermore, this part
concludes that such overinclusive outpatient laws are unsuitable
means for treating mentally ill individuals. Given the coercive and
intrusive characteristics of these statutes, this Note proposes that
states also focus on voluntary programs and recovery-oriented
services based on choice in treating the mentally ill.
A. Proponents of Kendra's Law
Proponents of Kendra's Law maintain that assisted outpatient
commitment effectively ensures that severely mentally ill individuals
will receive much-needed community treatment.254 The basis of this
contention stems from the theory of deinstitutionalization and the
accessibility of treatment facilities in the community. 251 Proponents
maintain that in outpatient programs, "patients [will] be better served,
since they [can] have a more normal life, while the state [can] reduce
the significant costs of long-term, round-the-clock care." 6 Moreover,
this intervention will treat mentally ill patients who are not presently
dangerous, but who may become violent in the future, thereby
reducing the risk of future tragedies similar to the death of Kendra
Webdale.
The understanding of mental illness has progressed significantly in
the past thirty years, and advocates of assisted outpatient laws believe
that legislation, the judicial system, and public awareness must
advance as well.2 7 Proponents maintain that outpatient commitment
promotes these goals by enabling judges to order a "less restrictive,
less expensive, [and] often [a] more beneficial option" to inpatient
hospitalization. 8 They argue that nearly half of those suffering from
psychotic diseases do not realize they are sick and in need of
254. See Mary T. Zdanowicz, Treatment Advocacy Center: Statement (released
Apr. 29, 1999) <http://ww.psychlaws.org/PressRoom/stmt%20-20subwayperez.
htm>.
255. See Miller, supra note 26, at 209; supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text
(describing the deinstitutionalization movement).
256. A New Look at Treating the Mentally Ill, supra note 45.

257. See Health Policy Tracking Service, supra note 18.
258. D.J. Jaffe, Outpatient Commitment: The Evidence (visited Jan. 28, 2000)

<http://www.schizophrenia.com/ami/advocacy/outpatient.html>.
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treatment. 9 This is because psychotic illnesses affect the brain's selfevaluation function and patients' ability to give informed consent. :6
Under Kendra's Law, professionals will monitor each individual's
treatment program and intervene if the individual becomes noncompliant.2 61 Proponents contend that these services will ultimately
"prevent violence, reduce hospital readmission rates, and save [the
state] money."2 62
Supporters of Kendra's Law acknowledge that individuals have
certain constitutional rights to refuse medical treatment, including a
right to liberty and privacy. However, they also note that such
interests are not absolute. Courts have consistently held that the
individual right to refuse antipsychotic drugs may be overcome by the
state in the event of an emergency or when an individual is deemed
incompetent.
Advocates of Kendra's Law seemingly assume that
the statute is consistent with both prongs of this constitutional
mandate.
Supporters of outpatient protection have found that in recent years
courts have relaxed the strictness of the "dangerousness" standard in
determining the state's ability to medicate civilly committed patients,
and are statutorily defining the term "emergency" in a broader
manner.64 In the Massachusetts case of Rogers v. Commissioner of
Mental Health,2 65 for example, the court expanded the definition of
"emergency" to prevent "immediate, substantial, and irreversible
deterioration of a serious mental illness." 24 The justification for this
expansion was to prevent future violence, rather than focusing solely
upon the elimination of immediate societal threats.21 Advocates
argue that Kendra's Law is consistent with this definition because it
authorizes involuntary medication "in order to prevent a relapse or
deterioration which would be likely to result in serious harm to the
patient or others."' 64
In the absence of an emergency, proponents of Kendra's Law
contend that the statute is also constitutional under the parens patriae
doctrine. The parens patriae authority applies when an individual
259. See Marquis & Morain, supra note 9.
260. For a more detailed analysis of schizophrenia and neuroleptic drugs, see
Doudera & Swazey, supra note 5, at 1-18.
261. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.48 (a), (b) (McKinney 1999).
262. Involuntary Outpatient Comnitnent Violates Basic Constitutional Rights
Guaranteedto All Americans (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://homes.arealcity.comfLPS
involuntary.html> [hereinafter Commitinent Violates Basic ConstitutionalRights].
263. See supra Part II.B.
264. See Weiner & Wettstein, supra note 25, at 130. Some examples of states that
ubiquitously define "emergency" are New Jersey and Massachusetts. See id. at 123.
265. 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
266. Id.at 322 (quoting In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass.
1981)).
267. See id
268. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(6) (McKinney 1999).
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cannot care for herself or is unable to participate in treatment
decisions.269 In such situations, the government intervenes to protect
the well being of individuals deemed incompetent. 2 0 Kendra's Law
authorizes involuntary psychotropic medication for individuals
"unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision,"2 7
and who are "unlikely to voluntarily participate in the recommended
treatment ....
,,72 Advocates maintain that in the name of public and
patient protection, this language meets the standard of
"incompetency" that is necessary to compel mental patients into
treatment.27 3
Finally, Kendra's Law supporters assert that the statute is consistent
with the least restrictive alternative doctrine. 74 Without community
treatment, the only alternatives for the mentally ill are hospitalization
and imprisonment, both of which are more intrusive than outpatient
commitment. 27 5 Mental hospitals "[bear] some similarities to prisons"
and confine individuals for extended periods of time.2 76 Advocates of
outpatient commitment argue that community treatment, by contrast,
protects mental health consumers from becoming disenfranchised,
facilitates a process of stable rehabilitation, and avoids the "crisis277
oriented approach" that governs many mental hospital systems.
B.

Arguments Against Outpatient Commitment

Civil libertarians and patients' rights advocates vigorously oppose
outpatient statutes, such as Kendra's Law, as "harsh quick fix[es] that
[do] little to address the system's underlying problems"278 of
inadequate funding and services for the mentally ill.2 79 They fear that
such legislation is nebulous because it fails to delineate clear criteria
269. See supra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 235-53 and accompanying text.
271. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(3).
272. Id. § 9.60(c)(5).
273. See, e.g., Sally Kalson, Mental Health Expert to Share Experiences, Insights,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 28, 1999, at All ("Kendra's Law... makes it easier...
to compel seriously mentally ill patients... to receive medication and treatment, as
long as the treatment has been shown to help them and they are judged unable to
make informed decisions themselves." (emphasis added)).
274. See Beis, supra note 25, at 193. "In the mental health area, the doctrine of
least restrictive alternative is a major factor in the decision of where a patient should
be treated as an alternative to hospitalization." Id.; see supra notes 46-55 and
accompanying text.
275. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 27.
276. Id.
277. Arrigo, supra note 42, at 85. Advocates maintain that "psychosocial treatment
in the community introduces the patient to the experiences of living.., in a
nonpsychotic state." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
278. Julie Fields, N.J. PanelRehctant to Force Mentally Ill to Take Medication, The
Record (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug. 4, 1999, at A4.
279. See Randy Kennedy, A Crusaderfor Mentally Ill Lost Old Allies, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1999, at B2.
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for outpatient commitment, and will ultimately restore high rates of
inpatient commitment. 2'
Opponents of Kendra's Law maintain that the refusal of
psychotropic medication is a fundamental right rooted in New York's
constitutional protections of liberty, expression, and the right to
privacy.28 New York courts have found that "[florcible medication
can alter mental processes and limit physical movement, and therefore
is analogous to bodily restraint."'
Bodily invasions, such as
involuntary medication, implicate due process rights, which require
some governmental justification.'m The precise level of state scrutiny
will in turn depend upon the seriousness of the intrusion.'
Courts
have maintained that these rights are abrogated in only two situations:
(1) during an emergency or (2) when an individual is deemed
incompetent.m2 5
Opponents assert that Kendra's Law is
unconstitutional because it infringes on individual rights wvithout a
determination of either.
New York courts have indubitably established that an "emergency"
exists only when there is an imminent danger to a patient or the
community.' Furthermore, a "dangerous" person is defined as one
who "engages in conduct or is imminently likely to engage in conduct
posing a risk of physical harm."' Kendra's Law, however, authorizes
medical treatment to prevent a relapse or subsequent mental
deterioration rather than when an individual poses an imminent threat
to society.'
The purpose of the law is to intervene "before the
individual becomes dangerous."'
Thus, without meeting the
requirement of imminence, the state's police power interest is not
sufficiently compelling to justify forcible intrusive treatment.
Some states, such as Arizona, use outpatient commitment as an
alternative to hospitalization and apply inpatient criteria prior to

280. See Hicks, supra note 94.
281. See Marquis & Morain, supra note 9; supra notes 190-94 and accompanying
text.
282. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
283. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 210-53 and accompanying text.
286. See Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, § 527.8(c)(1) (1995)); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,
496 (1986) (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, § 27.8(b) (1995)). In New
York, emergency treatment may be authorized over objection where the patient is
"presently dangerous." N.Y. Comp. Codes R.& Regs. tit. 14, § 527.8(c)(1) (1995).
287. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, § 527.8(a)(4) (emphasis added).
28& See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(6) (McKinney 1999). Even organizations
dedicated to educating communities on the benefits of assisted outpatient treatment,
such as the Treatment Advocacy Center, maintain that Kendra's Law is preventative
in nature. See Zdanowicz, supra note 254.
289. See Zdanowicz, supra note 254.
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authorizing medical treatment.290 By utilizing outpatient statutes in
this capacity, Arizona courts are ensuring that only severely mentally
ill individuals will be involuntarily medicated. However, under
Kendra's Law, an individual can be forced into outpatient
commitment despite the fact that she is not dangerous and does not
meet the requirements for inpatient care.2 9'
Rather, this law
purportedly treats individuals before they become an imminent threat
to themselves or others. Allowing forced treatment for nondangerous reasons-including speculation of future deterioration or a
history of refusing medication-will inevitably violate both the federal
and state constitutions by involuntarily medicating competent
individuals.2 9
Critics also argue that Kendra's Law does not explicitly require an
adjudication of incompetency before authorizing forced medication.2 93
Courts have consistently held that competent patients have the
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.294 Competency is
treated as a prerequisite to informed consent, and its absence must be
established in order for the state to invoke its parens patriae power.295
Kendra's Law states that:
If the recommended assisted outpatient treatment includes
medication, such physician's testimony shall describe the types or
classes of medication which should be authorized, shall describe the
beneficial and detrimental physical and mental effects of such
medication, and shall recommend whether such medication should
be self-administered or administered by authorized personnel.296
Because the statute fails to indicate whether the patient must be
"incompetent" prior to the authorization of medication, the state
cannot constitutionally invoke its parens patriae authority.297 The
failure of Kendra's Law to make incompetency an explicit prerequisite to forced medication violates the principles of autonomy,
liberty, and the constitutional right to privacy, by limiting a functional
person's ability to make informed decisions without governmental
290. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-540(A)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1999)
(mandating that dangerous patients shall undergo either outpatient treatment or
combined inpatient and outpatient therapy).
291. In New York, current inpatient commitment laws apply to persons who are
regarded to be a danger to themselves or others. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 9.39,
9.40 (McKinney 1994). However, for one to be eligible for outpatient commitment,
Kendra's Law establishes a different set of criteria that must first be met. See N.Y.
Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c) (McKinney 1999).
292. See Commitment Violates Basic ConstitutionalRights, supra note 262.
293. See id. ("Allowing forced medication of nondangerous persons would mean
that persons with psychiatric diagnoses would lose their right to give informed
consent to treatment and their right to refuse unwanted treatment.").
294. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
296. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(h)(4).
297. See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text.
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intrusions. 298
Moreover, Kendra's Law prescribes that an outpatient must be
"unlikely" to survive in the community sans supervision. It is
unclear, however, what the legislature meant by the term "unlikely."
Did they intend for it to have the same implications as
"incompetency"? Although the competency question is of critical
importance, there is no general consensus among states concerning
the appropriate legal standard for ascertaining competency. Various tests have been applied (sometimes in combination) to
determine "[a] patient's ability (a) to make and express a decision; (b)
to actually understand the information disclosed about the treatment
and alternatives to treatment; (c) to engage in decision making in a
rational manner... ; and (d) to make a reasonable treatment
decision."3"1 If the standards used to define legal "competency" vary
considerably, then it will be even more arduous for courts to decipher
the meaning of the term "unlikely." As one commentator notes,
"[b]elief of intent, the subjective interpretation of language or acts,
and even personal bias, may come into play under these criteria." -"The stigmatizing tendency to disbelieve people with mental disorders
may also affect court decisions.0 3 Opponents maintain that without
more clarity, this law will "give psychiatrists far greater latitude in
their subjective determinations of persons considered to meet vague
standards of being 'unlikely'... to 'survive in the community"' ' and
will ultimately infringe on the constitutional rights of competent and
functional patients.
In addition, opponents of Kendra's Law challenge whether the
statute is actually the "least restrictive alternative."0 5 Because of the
law's arbitrary standards, competent patients may be compelled to
take their medication or risk involuntary hospitalization:
Undeniably, involuntary treatment is one of the most severe actions a
government can impose on an individual, short of a criminal charge.3
Coercive treatment has many negative effects on individuals,
undermining their "motivation, learning and general sense of
organismic well-being.""
Moreover, psychotropic medication is
298. See supra Part II.B.2.

299. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(3).
300. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22,at 349.
301. Id.
302. MadNation, Seven Misconceptions,supra note 64.
303. See id
304. MadNation, Memorandum of Opposition A.8477 (Silver et al) "Te Assisted
Outpatient Treatment Act" (visited Jan. 21, 2000) <http'J/www.madnation.orglnewsi
kendra/opposition.htm>.

305. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
306. See Melanie Carroll, Protesters Rail Against Kendra's Law, Associated Press
Newswires, Aug. 25, 1999, at 1.
307. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 85.
308. Id-at 336 (citation omitted). Institutionalized patients coerced into accepting
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distressing and may present a variety of unwelcome side effects.3°9 As
compared to other forms of treatment, including verbal
psychotherapy, behavior therapy, and voluntary services, psychotropic
medication is the most intrusive and hazardous form of therapy.10
Aside from constitutional implications, opponents contend that
outpatient laws are faulty in many other respects. First, basing
involuntary treatment decisions on the guesswork of physicians and
psychiatrists is problematic. As to the speculation of future violence,
the medical professional's ability to predict dangerous behavior
remains unclear. 311 The American Psychiatric Association has stated
that "psychiatrists have no special knowledge or ability with which to
predict dangerous behavior. ' 312 Physicians also recognize that there is
a tendency to overestimate the "curative" effects and 3to
13
underestimate the less desirable effects of antipsychotic medication.

Moreover, it is difficult for psychiatrists to offer definitive conclusions
about the effectiveness of treatment on any particular patient.3

4

One

of the most persuasive criterion for courts ordering outpatient medical
treatment under Kendra's Law is the examining physician's
determination that "the patient will benefit from assisted outpatient
treatment. 31

5

Because the efficacy of such medication is not always

apparent, the language of Kendra's Law may lead a greater number of
mentally ill persons into unwarranted coercive treatment.
Second, while psychotropic drugs are efficacious in the treatment of
many mental patients, for some, they present unacceptably high risks
of toxicity and unpropitious side effects.316 These risks can be
eliminated only by closely monitoring patients and carefully

medication may come to view themselves as incompetent in ways that could worsen
their mental health and social problems. See id.
309. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
310. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 42. "Behavior
therapy postulates that maladaptive behaviors are learned and reinforced by the same
principles of conditioning as 'normal' responses and ... may be altered through the
systematic application of principles of learning theory." Id. Verbal psychotherapy
seeks to ameliorate mental symptoms in the context of a patient-therapist
relationship. See id. at 30. Recent research supports the superiority of these
approaches and maintains that such interventions have more lasting effects than
pharmacological approaches. See id. at 50. Moreover, psychotropic medication
presents a greater potential for misuse and abuse than these other treatment methods.
See id.at 85.
311. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983); Miller, supra
note 26, at 21.
312. APA, supra note 2.
313. See Doudera & Swazey, supra note 5, at 11-13; see also Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) ("Psychiatric diagnosis... is to a large extent based on
medical 'impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the
experience of the diagnostician.").
314. See Doudera & Swazey, supra note 5, at 11-13.
315. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(7) (McKinney 1999).
316. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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controlling dosages. 31 This practice is difficult in understaffed mental
hospitals and may be nearly impossible in outpatient programs, where
patients are unmonitored and unregulated.1 8 Moreover, Kendra's
Law gives courts permission to order outpatients to self-administer
psychotropic medication as part of their treatment regimens?' 9
Without direct supervision, patients are left vulnerable to serious
abuses, misuse, and hazardous risks.
Finally, opponents maintain that Kendra's Law would not have
prevented the death of victims such as Kendra Webdale. The law
attempts to make involuntary commitment easier. Kendra Webdale's
assailant, Andrew Goldstein, voluntarily sought commitment or
supervised living thirteen times prior to his horrific outburst!However, he was repeatedly discharged and denied assistance because
of an underfunded mental health system.32' While Kendra's Law
attempts to assist individuals who are "unlikely to voluntarily
participate" 322 in treatment programs, it provides no safeguards for the
mentally ill who recognize their illnesses and seek help voluntarily.
Only additional funding and services can aid these individuals.
C. The Resolution: Kendra'sLaw Is Overbroadand Violates Basic
ConstitutionalRights
There is a tremendous need for an environment in which the
mentally ill have widespread access to recovery-oriented
rehabilitation and self-help services. New York has responded to this
need by enacting Kendra's Law, which is intended to enhance
compliance Nvith community treatment, improve functioning, and
reduce hospital recidivism. 23 However, this statute is a "dreadful
'knee-jerk' political [reaction]" to the tragically violent death of
Kendra Webdale.324
Not only is Kendra's Law facially unconstitutional, but involuntary
outpatient commitment laws in general are improper means of
treating those suffering from psychiatric illnesses. Courts have
consistently held that mentally ill prisoners, detainees, and inpatients
retain constitutional liberty and privacy interests in refusing unwanted
317. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22. at 83.
318. See id. at 79-85.
319. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.606)(4). New York's 1994 pilot program did
not authorize the self-administration of medication. See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg.
Law § 9.61 (McKinney 1994) (failing to specify whether medication can be selfadministered).
320. See Bernstein, supra note 6.
321. See id. (describing the "long waiting lists" for admittance into state-financed
mental institutions).
322. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(5) (McKinney 1999).
323. See generally Swartz et al., The Ethical Challenges, supra note 206, at 35
(discussing the goals of outpatient laws in general).
324. MadNation, Replacing Outpatient Conmitnent, supra note 57.
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medication. Outpatients are logically entitled to similar, or even
greater, constitutional protections. Because outpatients by definition
are not imminently dangerous to society and retain some degree of
functional capacity, they are deserving of the most strict level of
scrutiny before involuntary medication is authorized.
The arguments opposing Kendra's Law are a step in the right
direction.3u
Critics properly maintain that the statute is an
infringement on an individual's liberty interest, freedom of
expression, and right to privacy. Kendra's Law is preventative in
nature rather than a mechanism for impeding immediate danger, and
therefore does not invoke the government's police power authority.326
Furthermore, because the law does not provide a constitutionally
adequate procedure for determining whether an outpatient is
incompetent, the state cannot authorize involuntary medication under
the parens patriae doctrine.2 7
When examining New York's involuntary outpatient statute prior
to Kendra's Law, one discovers section 9.61(c)(2) of the 1994 pilot
program, which authorized psychotropic medication for individuals
incapable of making treatment decisions on their own.328 Kendra's
Law likewise contained a similar provision when it was first
introduced to the Senate on June 3, 1999.329 The proposed statute
stated:
A court may order the involuntary administration of psychotropic
drugs... if the court finds the hospital has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the patient lacks the capacity to make a
treatment decision as a result of mental illness and the proposed
treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to the
patient's liberty interest in refusing medication, taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best
interest, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the adverse
side effects associated330with the treatment and any less intrusive
alternative treatments.

This section, however, was eliminated from Kendra's Law as
enacted in August 1999.331 A logical explanation for this purposeful
omission is that the New York legislature wished to enact a sweeping
law that would embrace a large number of mentally ill individuals,
rather than limiting involuntary medication to those severely ill. The
lax criteria under the enacted statute inevitably violate both the
325. See supra notes 278-322 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
328. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.61(c)(2) (McKinney 1994).
329. See S. 5762, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (describing the first version of
Kendra's Law as it was introduced to the Senate on June 3, 1999).
330. Id. (emphasis added).
331. See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c) (omitting any reference to the
kinds of circumstances that warrant involuntary medication).
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procedural and substantive due process rights of nonviolent,
competent patients and result in a blanket infringement of individual
civil rights.
The legislature can address the flaws in Kendra's Law in a number
of ways. One alternative is to reinstate a provision specifying that
antipsychotic medication may be involuntarily administered only upon
a finding of legal incompetence. Many other states include such
standards in their outpatient commitment laws, and authorize
medication only after a determination that an individual is incapable
of making medical decisions on her own.112 For example, Wyoming
recently enacted a new mental health bill that allows courts to
prescribe psychotropic medication only when individuals are
"incompetent to make an informed decision."33 Such provisions set
explicit standards, thereby reducing the potential for constitutional
infringements.
A second solution would be to statutorily encourage patients to
engage in advance planning in order to express their desires about
Advance health care proxies bear a strong
future treatment.3'
resemblance to a will and allow individuals to make future treatment
decisions while they are still competent. 35 Under Kendra's Law,
courts are required to consider whether a patient has created a health
care proxy before authorizing outpatient commitment.3" However,
this is only one factor weighed against the other listed criteria.
In its landmark "right-to-die" case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri

Department of Health337 the Supreme Court recognized that a patient
enjoys a constitutionally protected liberty interest in making future
health care decisions.3" Although Cruzan involved the right of a
terminally ill patient to discontinue life-prolonging treatment, the
Court's language logically extends to both medical and mental health
treatment that is not life-prolonging. If a patient possesses a due
process right to accept or refuse medication, then "a competent
expression of the patient's desires should be respected" even if, at a

332. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-52-10.2 (1997); Alaska Stat. § 47.30.835(b) (Michie
1998); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 334-121 (Michie 1993) (statutes that require an
adjudication of incompetency).
333. 1999 Wyo. Sess. Laws 25-10-110(i)(E).
334. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 392-93. Under this
theory, patients are empowered to make decisions in advance (while competent)
concerning future health care needs arising at a time when they may later be
incapacitated. See id. at 392.
335. See Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 393. "Just as
individuals have the ability to dispose of their property upon death by expressing their
intentions in a vill, patients may control future health treatment through the use of
advance directive instruments." Id.
336. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(c)(8) (McKinney 1999).
337. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
338. See id. at 278-79.
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later date, the patient is incapacitated. 339 The New York legislature
should therefore give bolder force and effect to an outpatient's health
care proxy in order to preserve her constitutional right to refuse
involuntary medication.
Although the former solution would likely render Kendra's Law
constitutional on its face, and the latter would ensure that it is
constitutionally applied, both fail to resolve the law's larger problems.
While forty-one states have outpatient commitment laws, most of
these states refuse to enforce them.-4 In fact, "judges in many states
are not familiar or comfortable with the laws and are reluctant to use
them. ' 34' Thus, despite the fact that these laws are enacted out of
concern for public safety, in actuality they protect neither the public
nor the mentally ill when they remain underutilized.
Moreover, a recently completed study in New York City 342 found
that involuntary outpatient commitment was ineffective in reducing
hospital re-admissions and patient dangerousness. 43 Studies have
concluded that there are no significant differences in the treatment
outcomes of recipients of involuntary outpatient treatment and those
who do not receive such services.' Furthermore, research shows that
coercion undermines patient confidence, deters individuals from
seeking voluntary treatment, and increases the risk of "drug
dependence, disabling side effects of medication and suicide."34
Finally, involuntary outpatient commitment has not been
demonstrated to have a positive impact upon mental health or on a
patient's quality of life."
Overly broad outpatient commitment laws, such as Kendra's Law,
are simply "quick-fix[es]" that fail to address the mental health
system's underlying problems, such as lack of services, funding, and
programs.47 In this age of managed health care policies, hospitals are
provided with financial incentives to discharge patients promptly. 48
Kendra's Law will not change this "calculus of financial, political and
legal pressures" to release patients from mental hospitals." Even
under Kendra's Law, "[d]ownsizing of psychiatric hospitals will
continue... [and] the billions of dollars saved will continue to go to
339. Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 392.
340. See Health Policy Tracking Service, supra note 18.
341. Id.
342. The New York City Bellevue Study was an unpublished 1998 report by Policy
Research Associates. For a more detailed explanation of the results, see Torrey &
Zdanowicz, supra note 18, at 2-3.
343. See id at 3. However, the Treatment Advocacy Center also notes that the
PRA itself acknowledged flaws in its study due to the small sample size. See id.
344. See MadNation, Replacing OutpatientCommitment, supra note 57.
345. Kramer, supra note 23.
346. See id.
347. Fields, supra note 278.
348. See Bernstein, supra note 6.
349. Put an End to Mental Patients' 'Catch-22',Newsday, July 11, 1999, at B3.
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the state's General Fund, 3 ' rather than to community facilities.
Moreover, establishing a system in which large categories of
individuals can petition the already overcrowded courts to order an
individual into outpatient commitment 3 ' opens the floodgates of
litigation and subjects those displaying signs of mental illness to a
deprivation of their constitutional rights.
While outpatient commitment may be appropriate for those
severely mentally ill, in that it acts as a mechanism that allows such
individuals to live in the community rather than in a hospital, 352 a
more appropriate solution for less severely afflicted individuals is to
shift focus away from coercive therapies and toward rehabilitative
services based on choice. Undoubtedly, many mentally ill individuals
require medication to function in society. However, enacting
involuntary outpatient laws as broad as Kendra's Law are not
necessarily the proper way to meet this need. City and state
governments should expand the availability of effective individualbased rehabilitation and recovery-oriented services for patients who
are not deemed incompetent and therefore are not eligible for
outpatient commitment.3 3 These services should include crisis
prevention, management services, and plans that promote wellness,
independence, and personal responsibility. An extensive body of
psychological literature points to the positive value of allowing
individuals to exercise choice concerning a variety of matters affecting
them.3 Patient choice in treatment decisions, for example, is an
important determinant of treatment success:
Choice... may bring a degree of commitment that mobilizes the
self-evaluative and self-reinforcing mechanisms that facilitate goal
achievement. To the extent that patients' agreements to accept a
course of treatment recommended by therapists constitutes an
affirmative expression of3 patient choice of treatment, such choice
itself may be therapeutic. M
Rather than broadening involuntary outpatient commitment laws to
include virtually all mentally ill patients, governments must create a
spectrum of humane and attainable voluntary services that offer a
broad range of choices and respect patients' dignity. Involuntary
350. MadNation, Seven Misconceptions,supra note 64.
351. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(e) (McKinney 1999); supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
353. Crisis prevention services may include "peer-run programs for hospital
diversion and respite, peer-operated warmlines, drop-in centers and self-help groups."
Madnation, Arguments Against Outpatient Commitment and Alternatives to Force
(visited Jan. 28, 2000) <httpJ/wwwv.madnation.org/text/NYarguments.htm>.
354. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,37
Vill. L. Rev. 1705, 1755-68 (1992) (summarizing literature on the psychology of
choice).
355. Winick, Mental Health Treatment, supra note 22, at 329.
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commitment statutes and consequent forced medication should be
correspondingly limited in scope and applied only to patients who
present an emergency or are deemed incompetent. Only then will the
constitutional rights of mentally ill individuals be preserved.
CONCLUSION

Kendra's Law, adopted in the aftermath of Kendra Webdale's
death at the hands of a schizophrenic assailant, was undoubtedly
enacted with the best of intentions. Such headline-grabbing acts of
violence set the stage for outpatient commitment laws aimed at
lowering the standards for involuntary treatment in order to reach a
larger portion of the mentally ill community. However, outpatient
commitment is only one part of a much larger set of issues that
ultimately determines whether mentally ill individuals have access to
appropriate treatment and services.
If community treatment
resources are unavailable, outpatient commitment laws will ultimately
fail.
This Note argues that Kendra's Law, which provides for involuntary
medication absent an emergency or a declaration of incompetence, is
unconstitutionally vague.
Although New York courts have
established that forcible medication of a competent patient is
unethical and in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
Kendra's Law allows for such an act on its face. Furthermore, the law
does not provide a constitutionally adequate procedure to determine a
patient's competency prior to ordering psychotropic medication. No
legal basis exists to support the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs to a competent, non-dangerous mentally ill
outpatient.
Infringing upon the rights of individuals merely because they are
mentally ill is both unconstitutional and culturally loathsome.
Kendra's Law should be amended and reconciled with both federal
and state constitutional mandates. In addition, the legislature should
make voluntary support services and programs based on patient
choice and medically-monitored recovery widely available to mentally
ill individuals. Only then will tragedies such as the death of Kendra
Webdale be prevented.

